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About 
 
Shortly after the end of the Kosovo war, the last of the Yugoslav dissolution wars, the
Balkan Reconstruction Observatory was set up jointly by the Hellenic Observatory, the
Centre for the Study of Global Governance, both institutes at the London School of
Economics (LSE), and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw).
A brainstorming meeting on Reconstruction and Regional Co-operation in the Balkans
was held in Vouliagmeni on 8-10  July 1999, covering the issues of security,
democratisation, economic reconstruction and the role of civil society. It was attended
by academics and policy makers from all the countries in the region, from a number of
EU countries, from the European Commission, the USA and Russia. Based on ideas and
discussions generated at this meeting, a policy paper on Balkan Reconstruction and
European Integration was the product of a collaborative effort by the two LSE institutes
and the wiiw. The paper was presented at a follow-up meeting on Reconstruction and
Integration in Southeast Europe in Vienna on 12-13 November 1999, which focused on
the economic aspects of the process of reconstruction in the Balkans. It is this policy
paper that became the very first Working Paper of the wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series. The Working Papers are published online at www.balkan-
observatory.net, the internet portal of the wiiw Balkan Observatory. It is a portal for
research and communication in relation to economic developments in Southeast Europe
maintained by the wiiw since 1999. Since 2000 it also serves as a forum for the Global
Development Network Southeast Europe (GDN-SEE) project, which is based on an
initiative by The World Bank with financial support from the Austrian Ministry of
Finance and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The purpose of the GDN-SEE project
is the creation of research networks throughout Southeast Europe in order to enhance
the economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to build new research capacities by
mobilising young researchers, to promote knowledge transfer into the region, to
facilitate networking between researchers within the region, and to assist in securing
knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. The wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series is one way to achieve these objectives. 
The wiiw Balkan Observatory Global Development Network 
Southeast Europe 
This study has been developed in the framework of research networks initiated and monitored by wiiw
under the premises of the GDN–SEE partnership. 
 
 
The Global Development Network, initiated by The World Bank, is a global network of
research and policy institutes working together to address the problems of national and
regional development. It promotes the generation of local knowledge in developing and
transition countries and aims at building research capacities in the different regions.  
 
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies is a GDN Partner Institute and
acts as a hub for Southeast Europe. The GDN–wiiw partnership aims to support the
enhancement of economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to promote
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to assist in securing knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. 
 
The GDN–SEE programme is financed by the Global Development Network, the
Austrian Ministry of Finance and the Jubiläumsfonds der Oesterreichischen
Nationalbank.  
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www.gdnet.org 
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Understanding Reform: A Country Study for Bulgaria 
 
  1. Introduction 
  Since 1989, when economic and political transformation in the former communist 
countries started, the reform process in Bulgaria has been rather uneven, and often has 
changed direction. Compared to the countries in central Europe, it took much longer to define 
the course of reforms and until 1997 Bulgaria was a laggard in the reform process. The 
economy was in disarray: the transformational recession was coupled with macroeconomic 
and financial instability, industrial decay, massive layoffs and a debt crisis. In 1996-1997, the 
deepening macroeconomic imbalances escalated into a severe financial crisis combining a 
crash in public finances, run on the banks and a collapse of the currency, all of which gave 
rise to a hyperinflationary hike in early 1997. However, since 1997 the situation has changed 
radically: the course of economic and political reforms has been firmly set and the policy 
orientation towards a pluralistic democracy and market economy has gained support among a 
wide majority of the society. In political terms, this was a definitive shift in values embodied 
in a firm orientation towards EU and NATO membership. In terms of economic policy, the 
emphasis was placed on fast macroeconomic stabilization (based on a currency board 
arrangement) and acceleration of structural reforms. There was a remarkable turnaround in 
economic performance: inflation rapidly fell to low single digits, public finances were 
brought under firm control and the economy grew steadily at a relatively high pace which 
allowed for the recovery of real incomes and private consumption. 
  The sudden implosion of the communist regime in 1989 wiped out the previously 
existing societal and political structures. The newly emerging structures and stakeholder 
groups were not stable and continuously changed size and shape. The political forces found it 
difficult to form their vision of the future in their absence of guiding external signals. The 
heterogeneous societal structure triggered frequent change of governments which, in turn, 
pre-empted the adoption of a longer-term reform policies. The outcome was a stop-and-go 
reform course, with frequent change in policy direction and revisions in previously adopted 
measures.  
The 1996-1997 crisis was a turning point in Bulgaria’s transition. It was also a turning 
point in the attitude of society towards the reform process serving as a kind of catharsis. The 
crisis also had a profound impact on stakeholder groups which took a more stable and lasting 
shape. The guiding external signals coming from the west also strengthened, which helped in 
shaping the policy course and in consolidating its domestic support. Domestic 
macroeconomic policies were largely formulated under IMF guidance while the structural 
reforms implemented during that period were also t o a large degree prompted by the 
international financial institutions. The stabilization of the societal structure was reflected in 
the concomitant stabilization of the political structure which was reflected in the lengthening 
of the governments’ terms in office.  There emerged a broad consensus about the main 
direction of reforms which was supported by a wide majority of the population. The 
perceived irreversibility in reforms helped build the public understanding that the solution to 
the problems requires further reforms rather than their stalling. 
In this study, we analyze Bulgaria’s difficult economic and political transformation in 
an attempt to develop new insights into the mechanisms of the reform process. More 
specifically, we try to address three central questions: Why reforms in Bulgaria took or did 
not take place? What were the circumstances and condition that drove the reform process? 
What were the main outcomes of these reforms? Accordingly, we seek to identify the relevant issues for each of these questions and try to analyze the implied causal relationships 
and draw lessons and conclusions from Bulgaria’s experience with reforms. 
 
  2. Methodological issues 
 
  A brief overview of the literature on Bulgaria’s reforms 
  Bulgaria’s economic and political transformation has been the subject of extensive 
research and there are numerous academic publications analyzing this experience and seeking 
to explain Bulgaria’s peculiar reform path. A number of studies have attempted a more in-
depth analysis of the initial stop-and-go reform effort and its policy rationale. Avramov 
(1994), Avramov and Antonov (1994), Avramov and Guenov (1994) analyze the 
macroeconomic policies of the first phase of transition and the underlying causes of the 
persistent macroeconomic instability. Dobrinsky et al. (1994) look at the macroeconomic 
structural changes that took place after the initial economic liberalization and opening up of 
the economy. In a collection of essays, Jones and Miller (1997) provide an overview of the 
most i mportant macro- and microeconomic developments and policies in Bulgaria in the 
early 1990s. Kolarova and Dimitrov (1995) look at the political developments at the onset of 
transition, when the so-called “roundtable talks” shaped the political landscape for some 
years to come. Koford (2000), Kolarova and Dimitrov (1994) and Kolarova (1999) provide 
an analytical overview of the process of political change during this period. 
  The financial crisis of 1996-1997 is probably the episode that has attracted the most 
attention in the literature on Bulgaria’s transition. Several studies (Avramov and Sgard, 1996; 
Dobrinsky, 1994, 1996; Dobrinsky et al., 2001; OECD, 1997) analyze the policies and the 
sequence of events that lead to the crisis. By looking at the dominant political constellation, 
Wyzan (1998) seeks to reveal the underlying political causes of the failure to implement a 
workable reform package.  Most of these studies emphasize the key role of the policies 
tolerating financial indiscipline: this led to the accumulation of bad loans and quasi-fiscal 
deficits which, in turn, provoked the subsequent banking and fiscal crises. The nature of the 
crisis itself and its various facets have also been analyzed in detail in a number of 
publications (Balyozov, 1999; Berlemann, Nenovsky and Hristov, 2002; Dobrinsky, 1997, 
2000). Ackrill et al. (2002) look at the incidence of poverty in Bulgaria, which increased 
considerably as a result of the crisis. 
  In the years after the crisis, the reform process in Bulgaria has gained momentum and 
reforms have started to bear fruit. The policies of this period and their outcomes have also 
been scrutinized by academic research. Miller (1999) and Nenovsky and Hristov (2002) focus 
on the operation of the currency board, as a new approach to macroeconomic management in 
Bulgaria.  Dobrinsky (2001) brings to light some of the policy challenges faced by the 
Bulgarian authorities in an environment when, under the currency board arrangement, they 
lost much of the degrees of policy freedom. Horvath and Székely (2003) argue that, on the 
other hand, this environment provides the authorities with new opportunities to reform 
radically public finances. Nenovsky and Rizopoulos (2003) analyze the political economy of 
the monetary regime change of 1997 and describe it as an endogenous institutional change 
driven by the interactions of interest groups. Valev (2002) and Valev, and Carlson (2003) 
analyze the credibility of Bulgaria’s currency board and its role in changing expectations. 
Valev (2003) explores the political economy of the reform process after the crises and 
highlights the effect of perceived irreversibility in the reform process. 
A few studies have attempted a synopsis of longer periods in Bulgaria’s transition, 
covering different phases and stages of economic and political transformation. Thus Mihov 
(2001) provides an overview of the economic policies and changes during the first decade of 
transition. Minassian (2001) addresses Bulgaria’s (sometimes difficult) relations with the IMF and summarizes the outcomes of the Fund-supported programs of economic reform. Bitzenis 
(2003) looks at the process of privatization in Bulgaria and tries to explain some of the 
reasons for its uneven pace. However, none of them has provided a consistent explanation of 
Bulgaria’s overall reform pattern based on rational choice decisions. 
Despite this abundance of research, the available literature so far has not produced a 
comprehensive interpretation of the motivation and driving forces of Bulgaria’s reform 
process. The diverse and uneven developments in Bulgaria during a decade and a half of 
transition still raise a number of intriguing questions and puzzles. Why did it take so long for 
the reform course in Bulgaria to take shape? What brought society into disarray (mirrored in 
chaotic policies) in the initial phases in transition? Then, given this unfavourable start, how 
did it become possible to stage the subsequent turnaround? What were the driving forces 
behind the new political and policy orientation? If society was so heterogeneous in the initial 
phase, what brought together the majority that supported the new political and policy course? 
In this study we try to address some of these difficult questions. 
 
  Methodological framework of the study and main hypotheses 
The central research goal of this study – in the context of the overall “Understanding 
Reform” project – is to provide a broad and comprehensive picture of the transformation 
reforms in Bulgaria, their driving forces and outcomes. The study thus focuses on three main 
sets of questions:  Why? (the motivation of the reform process and its goals); What? (the 
nature of the reforms and their implementation) and How well? (the outcome of the reforms 
and whether it matched the goals). 
The main methodological technique applied in the study is that of an analytic 
narrative (Bates, 1998; Rodrik, 2003) which allows not only to organize better the 
chronological review of events but also to look for rational choices behind some of the 
seemingly messy developments. For this purpose we use extensively the results of some 
recent formal models of policy reform (see below). However, our methodologocal approach 
is generally problem-driven in the sense that that we start from our “research problem” 
(which is to understand the reform process in Bulgaria) and then we seek to apply 
methodological approaches that seem to offer the best clues to the various aspects of this 
problem, and not vice versa (from a specific theory to its application). In this sense, the 
methodology used is rather eclectic, employing different theoretical models and analytical 
techniques in dealing with various aspects and parts of the general research problem. 
Thus in addressing the three main sets of questions and, especially, in trying to 
understand the motivation and driving forces of the reform process in Bulgaria we try to offer 
some possible clues to this question using some of the results of the recent literature on policy 
reform, namely the strand that is sometimes referred to as “positive economics of policy 
reform” by Rodrik (1993). This strand of the literature seeks to address the issue of the 
motivation of the policy process, i.e. what are the driving forces that lead to one or another 
course of policy action. And secondly, it implies endogeneity of the policy process as well as 
of the inherent political constraints, i.e. that subsequent policy decisions on the course of 
reform very much depend on previous policy and its outcomes as well as on the changing 
sentiments of the populace. This literature (see Rodrik, 1993) applies common analytical 
standards to economic and political behaviour: it assumes that policy agents are rational and 
forward looking and that policy making rules are derived from solving of optimisation 
problems with well defined objective functions. The new literature on policy choice 
emphasizes the motivational aspect of a policy reform which is usually considered in the 
context of interest groups in society while the reform process is represented in the form of a 
strategic game between interest groups. The stake of the game is how the costs and benefits 
of reform are to be shared among interest groups. The political constraints are usually related to the voting power of the constituencies supporting or opposing reforms (which may change 
endogenously during the course of reforms) and the credibility of the reform policies. 
Following such an approach, some recent studies have been able to come up with 
plausible explanations of issues which have for long been kind of a puzzle in political 
economy, such as the questions: Why policy makers opt for apparently sub-optimal – and 
obviously unsustainable in the longer run – policies while policies that appear optimal are 
neglected? Why policy packages which work well in one country do not do so in another, and 
vice versa? If a reform package is finally adopted, what can explain the delay? In analyzing 
these issues we make extensive reference to the results of some well-known models of policy 
reform. 
However, we complement the rational choice models with a wide variety of additional 
analytical tools that allow us to understand better other aspects of the reform efforts, as well 
as the reform process as a whole. Thus in exploring the starting point and the context of the 
reform process we employ a historic perspective which allows us to identify and highlight 
some important structural factors (constraints or catalysts) of the reform process in Bulgaria 
(which are relevant both to the Why? and to the What? questions), and to trace their evolution 
during the course of reforms. In addressing the What? question, in addition to a continuing 
focus on the context, we employ extensively an institutional approach. We thus seek to 
identify the role of institutional factors in the reform process, which allows, on the one hand, 
to better understand some of the driving forces of the reform agenda, and, on the other hand, 
to identify and highlight some of the reasons for the encountered difficulties, especially in the 
implementation phase. In this case we consider the institutional environment in the broader 
sense of formal and informal “rules of the game” (North, 1990). In addressing the How well? 
question, we use extensively factual analysis and macroeconomic statistical data in order to 
draw conclusions about the direction of change of economic performance over time. We also 
try to compare the declared reform goals with the actual outcomes of the reform process. 
In employing the analytic narrative technique we also formulate hypotheses about the 
motivation of the process of reform and change in Bulgaria during the transition and we try to 
test them on the basis of the available empirical evidence. One of our main underlying 
hypotheses about the driving forces and direction of reforms is based on the notion of 
Bulgaria as a “switching periphery” at the Euro-Asian border. Being at the border of the two 
continents, historically Bulgaria has been experiencing the influence of “gravity forces” 
coming from different directions, and as a result of the changing strength of these forces, 
their combined effect has also been pushing domestic politics and policy in different 
directions. This underlying rationale of hypothesis is outlined in section 3.1. Based on this 
notion, we conjecture that the initial phase of economic and political transformation was one 
in which there was no definite and strong external push that would guide the course of 
domestic policies in any firm and specific direction. Instead, the external driving forces 
coming both from the west and from the east were  weak and hesitant; besides, they 
themselves did not always follow firm directions but often changed track. Another related 
hypothesis is that of path dependence in the transition process. If “history matters”, then the 
starting point is important for the actual course of subsequent reforms. 
For the purpose of the study we also formulate and test some additional hypotheses 
related to the motivation and driving forces of policy reforms such as: 
- The prevailing individual uncertainty about the outcomes of the restructuring and 
privatization of the enterprise sector (SOEs) can cause considerable delays in reforms 
(evidenced during the initial phase of transition in Bulgaria). 
- Disagreement between powerful interest groups about the sharing of the reform 
burden can be another deterrent in the reform process (also evidenced during the initial phase 
of reforms). - Institutional and structural bottlenecks and/or coordination failure can block the 
reform effort (as happened in the initial phases of Bulgaria’s reforms); by contrast, a 
supportive institutional environment as well as better coordination can act as catalysts of the 
reform effort (as seen during the second phase). 
- A major economic crisis (as that experienced in Bulgaria in 1996-1997) can open a 
window of opportunity for the acceleration of the reform process. 
Furthermore, based on the available empirical evidence, we argue that the crisis 
marked in fact a major structural break in the process of Bulgaria’s reforms: due to the 
magnitude of turbulence and the instability in the underlying structural processes the crisis 
triggered fundamentally different structural relations and decision-making patterns in the 
period that followed. These two periods in Bulgaria’s reforms are broadly identified with 
“success” and “failure”. Notably, these are fuzzy concepts which possibly contain elements 
of subjective judgement. However, in the paper we attempt to justify this assessment on the 
basis of quantifiable and objective measures and indicators, reflecting economic performance, 
the outcomes of reforms and the general domestic and external perception of the reform 
progress (table 1). In order to deal with the structural break, we essentially offer a sequential 
chain of two narratives: one dealing with reform failure (the initial phases of transition) and 
another one about success (the later stages). Accordingly, we analyze the economic and 
political context, and seek to identify and test plausible rational choice models for each of 
these fundamentally different sub-periods of the reform process.  
 
3. The starting point of economic and political transformation 
 
  Bulgaria as a “switching periphery”  
Due to its geographic location, Bulgaria’s geopolitical status has always been that of a 
periphery. During the Ottoman rule ( which lasted in Bulgaria for 500 years) it was a 
periphery of the Ottoman empire. After re-gaining independence in 1878 as a result of the 
Russian-Turkish war, Bulgaria agonized for a couple of decades between the gravity forces of 
Russian and western European powers, before sliding into the German sphere of influence for 
several decades. As a result of the new division of Europe after World War II, Bulgaria 
became part of the Soviet east European empire. The communist party that seized power for a 
period of more than 40 years pursued an orthodox pro-Soviet course, transforming the 
country into the most loyal foreign ally of the Soviets. This period lasted until the fall of the 
communist regime and the start of economic and political transformation in 1989. 
Often the domestic political orientation of the country to one or another external 
“center” was also associated with the business interests of the local stakeholders. Switching 
from one center to another was always painful and was accompanied by a major overhaul of 
both the political constellation and of the economic power structure. Accordingly, those who 
happened to be on the “correct” political side were also rewarded with solid economic gains. 
The peripheral status was not only a geographic feature but historically also a self-
perceived feature in the mindset of many Bulgarians, and this had important implications for 
domestic politics and policy. The notion of the “great powers” always played a key role in 
domestic politics. Historically, a number of political forces used to define their identity 
relative to the “great power” that they chose as their guide and main foreign ally. So when 
they came to power, their foreign and domestic policy were anchored to the respective “great 
power” and this largely shaped Bulgaria’s participation in the international division of labor. 
In turn, by offering their loyalty to the mighty ally, they sought to gain foreign protection and 
security for the country as well as economic benefits such as a preferential access to foreign 
markets and to other external resources. Such a symbiosis reached its most comprehensive (and lucrative for Bulgaria and its 
elite of that time) form during the late Soviet years. It is a well-known fact that among the 
communist countries, Bulgaria was probably the most trusted political ally of the Soviet 
Union. At least up to a certain moment in time (until Gorbachev came to power) the USSR 
was willing to pay a certain price for this political loyalty in the form of relatively more 
generous economic concessions to Bulgaria such as excessive supplies (relative to other 
communist states) of energy and other resources at below world market prices and granting 
excessively large (relative to other communist countries) access to Bulgarian exporters on the 
Soviet market. The details of these concessions have never been revealed but by all available 
estimates the Bulgarian economy was the most closely attached to the Soviet one and the 
share of USSR in Bulgarian trade was the highest among all east European  countries 
(Dobrinsky, 1997). Underpricing the exports of Soviet natural resources and overpricing of 
the Soviet imports amounted to net capital “grants” that communist states received from the 
USSR. Although the USSR practices such indirect capital transfers to all communist 
countries, their size obviously reflected the political preferences of the Soviets. Bulgaria’s 
privileged position meant that it received disproportionately large grants as compared to other 
east European countries and this was a provision that lasted for some 25 years: from the 
beginning of the 1960s until mid-1980s. 
  The end of communism dealt a major blow to the role of Russia as Bulgaria’s 
“leading great power” and signalled the end of this special relation. It also marked the 
beginning of another period of agonizing search for a new external political (and policy) 
anchor. At least at the beginning of transition the legacy of communism weighed heavily in 
this process: a large number of the former elite (who were now feverishly trying to transform 
their previous political clout into economic power) had strong informal links with the former 
Russian elite (which was occupied with a similar strategy). Due to that, there were strong 
domestic political forces that struggled to preserve the dominance of Russia as an external 
anchor. At the same time, part of the new political elite advocated a radical break with Russia 
and a full-fledged re-orientation to the West, pointing to the EU and US.  
However, when the changes started, neither Russia,  nor the West signalled any 
notable interest in Bulgaria: Russia was too pre-occupied with its own difficult transition
1, 
while the West appeared unprepared to make a decision on this part of the European 
periphery (partly because it still perceived it as part of Russia’s sphere of interest). Note that 
from this perspective, Bulgaria’s situation differed from that of the central European former 
communist countries which were immediately “recognized” by the West as belonging to its 
patrimony. The absence of clear external signals helped prolong the on-going soul-searching 
in Bulgaria’s domestic politics. Under these circumstances, the shaping of the new political 
orientation of the country took more time than would have been the case in a different 
external environment. 
   
The legacies of the communist past 
  In the second half of the 1980s the Bulgaria was adversely affected by two external 
developments. The coming of Gorbachev to power in the USSR meant a radical change in the 
economic relations of the two countries. First of all, Gorbachev tried to eliminate some of the 
price asymmetries in Soviet trade with communist countries which resulted in a decline (if 
not complete elimination) of the net capital grants to communist countries. Secondly, 
Gorbachev abolished the previous special economic privileges that Bulgaria used to enjoy, 
                                                 
1 The sudden “divorce” between Russia and Bulgaria is mirrored in the sharp drop of the volume of bilateral 
trade: thus while in 1989 the ex-USSR accounted for nearly 60% of Bulgaria’s exports, in 1992 this share fell to 
12%; in the same period the share of the ex -USSR in Bulgarian imports dropped from 34% to 19% (based on 
historic Bulgarian national statistics). placing the country on an equal footing with other communist countries. A second blow to 
the economy came with the end of the Gulf war: Bulgaria used to be a major exported of 
arms both to Iran and Iraq and the end of the conflict meant the drain of a major source of 
hard currency earnings.  
In hindsight, the changes that were taking place in the second half of the 1980s were 
pointing to the need for a major adjustment of the Bulgarian economy to the new conditions. 
However, the communist authorities were not prepared for this as it would have required 
some painful restructuring measures. Instead, they opted for the less painful but highly risky 
strategy of boosting foreign borrowing. B y borrowing abroad, the authorities sought to 
compensate for the lost capital transfers from Russia, thus temporarily shielding the economy 
from the necessity to restructure and adjust. However, instead of the “free lunch” that 
Bulgaria used to enjoy, the new meal came at a very high price. As a result of this hazardous 
policy, within five years Bulgarian gross foreign debt more than tripled: from USD 2.9 billion 
in 1984 to USD 10.7 billion in 1989.
2 At the same time hard currency exports at best 
stagnated and exports to other communist countries started to decline. 
  By the degree of its dependence on USSR deliveries and on USSR markets the 
structure of the Bulgarian economy was probably more similar to that of some of the ex-
Soviet republics than to the economies of other east European countries, especially those in 
central Europe. Consequently, the shock of the disintegration of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA, the trading arrangement between the communist countries) to 
the Bulgarian economy resembled the shock to these republics from the disintegration of the 
USSR, and was much stronger than the shock experienced by other post-communist 
countries. From this perspective, Bulgaria embarked on the process of economic and political 
transformation from a more unfavourable starting point compared to its east European 
neighbors. 
  The foreign debt was not the only economic problem that emerged in the eve of 
transition. The partial loss of privileged access to the Soviet market and the reduced demand 
in the lucrative weaponry market meant that part of the Bulgarian manufacturing industry 
was pushed to operate below its capacity and this led to a notable lowering of the rates of 
growth in the second half of the 1980s. The main problem (one that was fully exposed with 
the collapse of the CMEA) was that the structure of the manufacturing industry was tailored 
to fit only the very narrow niche of what USSR and other communist countries were willing 
to purchase. The quality of most of Bulgaria’s manufactured goods did not meet international 
market standards and it was difficult, if not impossible, to re-orient the excess manufacturing 
capacity to other markets. 
  The external economic difficulties were mirrored by domestic problems. The 
discontinuation of the external subsidies also opened a gap in domestic public finances. The 
government tried to partially compensate for this through external borrowing but 
nevertheless, part of the imbalance was settled by printing money. As domestic prices 
remained under strict central control, this resulted in the acceleration of hidden and 
suppressed inflation through the accumulation of a sizeable monetary overhang. The long-
held policy of soft budget constraints combined with massive re-distribution of income 
through the public budget (partly to subsidize loss-making firms) accompanied by massive 
overemployment and unsustainable wage growth exacerbated the mounting domestic 
imbalances. By 1989 the amount of accumulated forced savings of the population reached 
                                                 
2 Foreign borrowing during that period consisted of both trade credit and official borrowing and. Creditors were 
willing to lend both due to the country’s track record as a prompt client and due to its perceived export 
potential/debt servicing capacity. The latter, however, was mostly based on exports to CMEA countries that 
collapsed after the start of transition. See Dobrinsky (1997). some two thirds of the country’s national income which caused constant shortages throughout 
the economy (Dobrinsky et al., 1994).  
In summary, Bulgaria’s embarked on economic and political reforms from an 
extremely unfavourable starting point. Although such difficulties were not uncommon in the 
other post-communist eastern European countries that were undergoing a similar process, the 
magnitude of the problems faced by Bulgaria was much greater which, as discussed later, laid 
its footprint on the process of economic and political transformation. Accordingly, the 
adjustment effort needed in the initial phase of transition was much more painful, and implied 
very strong political constraints. This is probably part of the explanation why reforms and 
policies that worked in other transition economies turned out to be unsuccessful (or non-
starters) in Bulgaria (we return to this issue in the next section). In this sense, history did 
matter in the case of Bulgaria’s transition. 
 
4. From non-reform to crisis (1989-1997) 
 
The context 
The sudden implosion of Bulgaria’s communist regime at the end of 1989 broke the 
previously existing political and economic structures. As in most east European countries 
(with the exception of Romania) the communist regime collapsed practically without any 
resistance, indicating that it had already disintegrated internally: its ideological base was 
irreparably compromised while in terms of economic performance it had proven to be a 
failure. The deep societal crisis in the country – as well as in the whole ex-communist world 
– was prompting the need for a major change and this was the main, fundamental incentive 
and driving force for reforms.  
However, compared to other countries in the region, the Bulgarian context was 
characterized by a number of specificities that de facto acted as deterrents to rapid and radical 
market reforms. Among these specificities were the unfavourable initial economic conditions, 
already discussed in the previous section. To these added factors related to the cultural, 
intellectual and ideological legacy and tradition.  
Incidently, the “Russian influence” turned out to be one of such factors. We shall try 
to clarify this point in comparison with the situation in other east-European post-communist 
countries. Throughout eastern Europe, in the post-World War II era, the Soviet Union was 
largely regarded as an occupier. Indeed, large Soviet troops were stationed in all east 
European communist countries, with the exception of Bulgaria (in this, Bulgaria was an 
exception as a loyal ally but also as a historically friendly country). The resentment of the 
population in these countries to the communist regimes at least partly mirrored a resentment 
to the occupying force. Conversely, with the fall of the regimes, the pro-market, pro-capitalist 
orientation were often associated with, and reinforced by, an anti-Soviet drive. The presence 
of a large polity with such an orientation helped the formation of a core consensus on the 
market reforms in most east European countries. This did not occur in Bulgaria to such an 
extent as – mostly due to the historic circumstances but also to business interests related to 
the close economic links between the two countries  – there was a large share of the 
population with a traditionally pro-Russian orientation. Parts of the group with pro-Russian 
orientation were at the same time vocal opponents to market reforms on ideological groups. 
Notably, the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union dealt a blow to this group and 
helped its further marginalization. 
In addition to that – again, unlike other east European countries – Bulgaria did not 
have a major tradition of political and intellectual dissidence. In other parts of the region 
these were fairly well established and even organized (as the Polish  Solidarnoszcz) 
movements, whose attitude towards reforms was already shaped before the start of economic and political transformation. A large number of post-communist political leaders originated 
from these dissident movements. While small dissident groups did exist in Bulgaria, they 
were not well organized and for the most part were not intellectually powerful. 
Ethnic factors also affected the reform course as Bulgaria has a large ethnic Turkish 
minority. Although traditionally there had not been internal conflicts based on ethnicity, 
during the last decade of communist rule this minority suffered from political oppression 
(such as the forced change of names to Slavic as well as the de facto expulsion of groups of 
ethnic Turks to Turkey). This helped shape a specific political agenda for the ethnic Turks at 
the onset of economic and political transition. 
 
The key actors 
The start of transition brought to life new stakeholder groups and political forces, 
which shaped the new policy process. On the self-declared “left” was the former Communist 
(later transformed into Socialist) Party (BSP) which continued to have a strong but rather 
diverse constituency. In the early years the BSP itself was a rather heterogeneous political 
formation. Within the party, there were at least two main factions: a non-reform faction with 
a pro-communist/pro-Soviet (which was at the same time anti-market/anti-Western) 
orientation, and a reformist faction with a social-democratic orientation which, without 
denouncing Russia, also sought closer links with Western Europe. While the non-reform 
wing advocated the preservation of the old economic and political structures (it was against 
the very concept of market economy) while mimicking some perestroyka-type reforms, the 
reformist wing recognized the principles of the market economy and accepted them as the 
main goal of the reforms but advocated a “social market economy”. But among those who 
leaned with BSP there were also members of the transforming old elite with business interest 
in Russia who regarded it as a political umbrella and a means to promote the preservation of 
closer economic links with Russia. At the same time, the BSP hosted the whole communist 
party nomenclatura which was trying to transform its past political power into economic 
power. At the same time BSP’s mass electorate mostly consisted of lower income groups and 
this often created notable conflicts between the interests of the electorate and those of the 
elite that controlled the party. As a result the BSP did not have a firm and clear policy line in 
this initial period and often changed its course. However, until 1997, the non-reform wing of 
the party in the main dominated BSP’s orientation and shaped the general line of its polices. 
A newly emerging reform-minded opposition organized itself into a loose coalition 
named Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). While claiming to belong to the “right”, the UDF 
was at first a very heterogeneous formation, and represented a wide political spectrum, both 
from the left and from the right. It brought together small political movements and groups 
with quite different political orientation: radical, christian-democrat, liberal, social-democrat, 
environmental, agrarian, etc. There was thus a similar identity conflict between declared 
policy goals (with a mostly rightwing orientation) and the political preferences of a large 
share of UDF’s electorate. The most well-organized part of UDF were the claimants of 
restitution rights who had a strong common interest: the restitution of property titles held in 
the past by their ancestors. Thanks to being relatively well organized, they managed to set the 
priorities in the UDF’s policy agenda in the initial period of transition (when UDF was in 
power in 1991-1992, these were among the first laws to be adopted by Parliament). With 
time, this rightwing hard core gradually took the lead within the UDF while the left-wing-
minded part disintegrated or departed. Later on this political formation also changed its 
façade by transforming itself from a coalition into a single party. 
It should also be noted that the collapse of the communist regime was followed by a 
rapid and lasting ideological polarization of the political debate. The UDF for quite some 
time centered its political arguments on the claim that it was the only political force that represented reform while BSP embodied the preservation of communism. Hence it – maybe 
unintendedly but somewhat simplistically  – narrowly narrowed the focus of the political 
discussion onto the dichotomy “reform or non-reform” rather than on the nature of the future 
reforms. Ironically, this polarization contributed to the amorphousness of the political 
landscape as it blocked for some time the constructive formation of political formations 
centered around interest-based stakeholder groups. One major exception was the Turkish 
minority with its clear identification signs (ethnic, cultural, territorial as well as economic – 
notably skewed towards tobacco growing and processing) and an agenda that was shaped as a 
reaction to the political repression. The largely ethnical Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
(MRF) claimed the political center. Notably, MRF preserved its identity largely unchanged 
during the whole transition period whereas the other political actors underwent considerable 
transformation. 
An important stakeholder group in the initial period was that of the employees in 
unviable SOEs affected by the loss of traditional CMEA markets. Most of these enterprises 
proved unviable under market conditions and their employees had much to fear from the 
envisaged restructuring of their firms, which meant job losses for a large number of them. 
SOE employees had thus a strong common (short-term) interest of maintaining the status quo, 
namely preserving their current employment and hence the continuing existence of their 
firms. As a large number of these firms were unviable under in a market environment, this 
was equivalent to a massive claim on budgetary subsidies.  
Although SOE employees were not organized as a single stakeholder group (in terms 
of revealed political preferences they were split between BSP and UDF), they did have a 
major impact on the policy process in the initial stages of transition.. Being an important 
political constituency and electoral group, none of the governments in office could afford to 
neglect the interests of such a large group. Given the unionist tradition, workers were fairly 
well organized and could become a real political threat, as demonstrated by the numerous 
strikes in this period. Besides, they did have political representatives in both major political 
parties. 
In addition, there were also the managers of SOEs who also had vested interests in 
maintaining the status quo in the firms under their control, which in their case implied both 
the preservation of the firms as going concerns and protection of their managerial positions. 
In particular, from their perspective, change of ownership, especially to a strategic investor, 
was often seen as a threat to their position as such a change would have implied a major 
change in the running of the firm, such that is usually associated with a new managerial team. 
Hence the interest of SOE managers and a stakeholder group included not only the claim to 
subsidies but also resistance to ownership change. Obviously, being a large and influential 
interest group, enterprise managers channelled their interests into the political arena. Most 
SOE managers at the start of transition were associated with BSP; when UDF came to power, 
it effectuated a massive purge of managers, installing its own supporters. However the 
change of political umbrella did not mean a change in the interests of enterprise managers as 
a stakeholder group.  
Apart from these stakeholder groups – most of which had their origin in the past – 
there was a small but growing group of new entrepreneurs that managed (often using semi-
legal channels or political umbrellas) to amass large chunks of capital during the early ears of 
transition. Compared to other economies in transition, in the case of Bulgaria this was not a 
plentiful bunch due to the absence of a strong natural resource base in the country (the easiest 
prey for this sour of “entrepreneurs”). But similarly to the “early winners” in other countries, 
the interests of this group were rather controversial: while supporting some reforms in the 
early phase, later they might seek to cement and compound their early gains by exerting influence on the actual reform agenda, which ultimately may degenerate into “state capture” 
(Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2003). 
Trade  unions (both traditional and newly emerging) tried to get the representation 
power of these stakeholders and consequently accumulated considerable political clout 
(manifested in numerous large-scale strikes, with serious political consequences). However, 
unions turned out to be incapable of providing genuine support for the interests of their 
constituency and gradually lost their influence. 
In March 1990 the Bulgarian government declared a unilateral moratorium on the 
foreign debt payments. While such a decision was probably technically inevitable, it was 
implemented in the worst possible manner, completely disregarding the creditors’ interests. 
This de facto excluded a substantial group of stakeholders – foreign creditors and potential 
investors – from active involvement in Bulgaria’s economic reforms in the initial period.  
Given the historic tradition in Bulgarian politics, there was an obvious absentee in the 
stakeholders’ constellation in the initial phase of transition: that of the strong external partner 
who would provide guidance in politics and policy to the extent of serving as their main 
anchor. The IFIs that did operate in Bulgaria obviously did not serve this purpose either. 
Bulgaria was granted membership in the IMF and the World Bank in 1990 and thus the 
international financial institutions also appeared on the policy scene through the 
conditionality of their funding activity. The start of market reforms in eastern Europe had 
given a new  raison d’être to the IFIs and they were keen to be part of this historically 
unprecedented change. However, as discussed below, for quite some time Bulgaria’s relations 
with them were tense due to mutual mistrust and lack of understanding of the actual 
economic problems on the ground. 
  The first phase of transition was featured by frequent change of governments 
representing different sides of the political spectrum (see their chronology in Appendix 1). 
The envisaged very short planning horizon was an inherent feature of the political process of 
this period which essentially pre-empted political strategies and polices targeting the medium 
or long-term horizon as a rational choice for politicians. The main problem was, that in the 
short- to medium-run, the needed reforms were expected to produce more losers than winners 
and hence these policies did not enjoy sufficient popular support. None of the governments in 
office demonstrated a full commitment to implement and bring to a successful end a wide-
ranging and comprehensive economic reform package. 
 
Stop-and-go reform policies 
  The initial phase of economic and political reforms in Bulgaria was framed by the so-
called Roundtable Talks.
3 One of the important outcomes of these talks was the decision to 
call a Grand National Assembly with the mission to adopt a new Constitution. While this 
mission was formally achieved in 1991, the fact that the Grand National Assembly was 
dominated by the former communists, diminished the perceived legitimacy of the new 
Constitution. While BSP won the 1990 elections, its government did not last for long and at 
the end of the year was replaced by a broad coalition government, formally supported by the 
main political forces in the Grand National Assembly (this “unity”, however, did not last for 
long either). The general elections in October 1991 brought the former opposition UDF to 
power for the first time. However, this government stayed in office only for one year due to 
internal conflict over the course of reforms, to be replaced by a non-partisan, “expert” 
                                                 
3  These were peaceful negotiations between the communist regime and representatives of the dissident 
community which resembled closely the Central European mode of transition. See Kolarova and Dimitrov 
(1995). government (de facto supported by an informal coalition between MRF and BSP).
 4 After the 
1994 general elections, BSP re-gained full control of parliament and formed its own 
government which stayed in office until the end of 1996.  
  The frequent change of governments of different orientation translated into a reform 
pendulum, with each new government pushing the reform process in different direction. 
Besides, the short terms in office meant that reforms initiated by one government were 
sometimes reversed by the subsequent one. One of the underlying goals of the broad coalition 
government (as formulated during the Roundtable Talks) was to ensure broad political 
consensus and support for the main reforms lying ahead. But consensus on the reform course 
de facto was never reached while the shared responsibility for the reforms in fact meant no 
responsibility. The UDF government of 1991 had a broadly liberal orientation and ambitious 
reform goals. However, its early fall after one year in office (mostly the result of internal 
conflicts) prevented it from implementing this program. In terms of the general reform effort, 
the period when the so called “expert government” was in office (from 1992 to 1994) was a 
period of stalled reforms. Lacking both strong political support and legitimacy (as it actually 
reversed the outcomes of the 1991 general elections), this government neither initiated major 
new reforms, nor showed any vigor in the implementation of reforms started earlier. When 
BSP came to power in 1995, its conservative, “non-reform” wing took  control of the 
government. It launched a highly controversial economic program, based on extensive state 
intervention (including the re-introduction of extensive price regulations, the introduction of 
industrial policies and increased stated control over the financial system) and reversed other 
reform measures introduced by previous government. As it turned out, this policy course had 
devastating consequences for the Bulgarian economy. 
  Given this unstable and varying political constellation, the reform and policy process 
did not have a clear direction. As discussed below, the IMF had a very prominent role in 
shaping the macroeconomic policy agenda in this period. As to the institutional and structural 
reforms (see Appendix 1 for an overview of the various aspects of the reform process in these 
years) their course mostly reflected the political orientation of the parties in office and the 
interests of the stakeholder groups they represented. However, as the stakeholder groups were 
also changing shape in this period, it is difficult to trace their impact on the general direction 
of the reform process. Probably the most clearly identifiable policy impact of interest group 
pressures was that generated by the workers and managers of SOEs: being an important 
constituency of the two main political parties they consistently exerted pressure for 
interventionist measures in support of ailing firms (as discussed later this translated into 
important policy acts). The “early winners” did affect the policy process lobbying  by 
corruption. However, it should be pointed out that it the case of Bulgaria their influence on 
the policy process never reached a scale that could be classified as “state capture”. These 
groups had rather diverse interests and were never well organized as a stakeholder group. 
  Among the main political reforms initiated after the adoption of the new Constitution 
one could point out the effort to establish autonomy of the three branches of power. However, 
the drive towards great autonomy was likely overdone and resulted the absence of mutual 
checks and balances between them. Consequently, the growing sense of impunity instigated 
inefficiency and bred corruption, especially (but not only) within the judicial system 
(Kolarova 1999). The inefficiency of (and, increasingly, the perceived corruption within) the 
judicial system gradually became a major impediment to the reform process.  
                                                 
4 According to the Constitution, after the UDF government was voted down by a non-confidence vote, the other 
parliamentary parties could attempt to form a government. The BSP failed in its attempt but it supported a 
government formally nominated by MRF. So the “expert government” was de facto a coalition between BSP 
and MRF.   The most comprehensive reform package initiated during the first phase of transition 
was the stabilization program designed under the supervision of the IMF in 1990 and 
launched by the broad coalition government in February 1991. The program envisaged price 
and trade liberalization, current account convertibility and unification-cum-liberalization of 
the exchange rate (under a floating exchange rate regime), liberalization of the domestic 
credit market, fiscal and budgetary reform and the start of a process of demonopolization and 
restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Avramov, 1994).  It also envisaged changes 
in the tax system: the introduction of a uniform profit tax rate while and the gradual 
unification of turnover taxes (Dobrinsky at al., 1994).  
  While this first reform program did push through important steps towards reforming 
the existing economic order (in the first place in liberalization) it did not achieve its main 
target, macroeconomic stabilization. The main reasons for this (such as design flaws and 
institutional and structural impediments) are discussed in more detail below. Here we would 
just add that, from a political economic point of view, the strong polarization of the political 
forces that took part in the broad coalition government was another factor that contributed 
negatively to its outcome. Under these circumstances political responsibility and ownership 
of the program were blurry and none of the political forces clearly identified itself with it. 
Thereafter, despite the political rhetoric of the time, macroeconomic stabilization de facto 
was abandoned as a policy priority by all governments in office and did not re-emerge as a 
key policy goal until 1997. 
The ownership reform (the transfer of property from state to private ownership) – the 
cornerstone of economic and political transformation – is indicative of the difficulties in the 
policy process in  Bulgaria. Although there were early attempts to adopt a legislative and 
institutional framework for the process of privatization (the legislative process is summarised 
in Appendix 1 while Appendix 2 gives an overview of the insitutional framework of the 
provatization process), implementation lagged considerably behind. In terms of regulation, 
one of the main problems was the apparent absence of a core consensus about the model of 
privatization (BSP favored mass privatization whereas UDF leaned towards commercial 
privatization) and about the direction of this process (an indication of this are the endless 
changes in the law – more than 30!). The low level of investor interest by foreign investors 
(which, in turn, was largely a fallout of the default on the foreign debt) was another 
impediment to privatization. Overall, until 1997 the pace of privatization was rather slow 
(table 4), especially, compared to other central and east European countries. Probably the 
only successful ownership reform in this phase was the restitution of property (agricultural 
land, real estate and industrial property) confiscated during communism which enjoyed 
relatively wide public support.
5 After the 1995 election, the BSP government finally launched 
its project for mass privatization (see Appendix 2).
6  
More generally, little progress was made in enterprise restructuring and reform which 
– in view of the extremely difficult and precarious situation of the manufacturing industry 
after the collapse of the CMEA market  – was probably one of the most urgent and 
fundamental reforms faced by policy makers. In the absence of a clear vision on privatization, 
the ailing enterprise sector continued to be dominated by socialist “dinosaurs” – large and 
inefficient industrial SOEs, designed to serve the CMEA market but unviable under market 
conditions. Although the previous organizational structure of the manufacturing sector was 
                                                 
5 According to opinion polls, about 45% of respondents claimed support for the ongoing restitution in 1992-
1993. See Stanchev (2003). 
6 Ironically, the actual implementation of the mass privatization project (the completion of the first wave and the 
whole second wave) was largely done by the UDF (which came to power in 1997), an ideological opponent of 
the project. partly broken down (through the “demonopolization” measures), this did not change the 
functioning of the core large single production units.  
Even more importantly, virtually none of the governments in office in this period 
managed to impose hard budget constraints on the inefficient SOEs, a policy considered 
essential for their successful restructuring ( Schaffer, 1998). Soft budget constraints took 
various forms but the most important among them were (often directed) soft credit by state-
owned commercial banks and the (tolerated) accumulation of arrears to the budget 
(Dobrinsky et al., 2001). This policy instigated financial indiscipline in the corporate sector 
as a whole, which later became one of the key factors that precipitated the financial crisis. At 
the same time, the governance of SOEs weakened and eroded, which created a conducive 
environment for what came to be known as “spontaneous privatization”, in fact  – the 
siphoning of their assets, which further weakened their viability.  
The reform of the financial sector started with an overhaul of the banking system: the 
creation in 1991 of two-tier banking system with an independent (at least on paper) central 
bank and a system of commercial banks out of the previous monobank system. In 1991, a 
Bank Consolidation Company was established with the goal of consolidating the 45 small 
state-owned banks into several larger banks, and then to privatize them. However, while the 
privatization of state-owned commercial banks was part of the agenda of financial reforms, 
very little was done in these early years for its practical implementation. By contrast, the 
entry to the market by new private commercial banks was rather liberal (in fact, lax): many 
new banks (often led by inexperienced teams) came into existence immediately after the start 
of financial reforms. On the other hand, the regulation of the financial system was poor: 
although prudential regulations were formally introduced, their enforcement was rather weak. 
Central bank independence was never stringently enforced and politicians applied various 
approaches to interfere with its policies. State-owned banks were also the objects of frequent 
interference by politicians who de facto used the banking system to intervene in the economy. 
The combination of political interference and weak supervision contributed to the general 
weakening of the whole financial system (both state-owned and private banks). 
Even as regards the issue of European integration and the prospects of EU 
membership – a key driving force of economic reforms in central and eastern Europe – 
Bulgaria’s record was mixed. Among the governments in office in this period, only the UDF 
government had a clear pro-European orientation. For BSP (which dominated most of the 
governments in office), in this period the prospect of EU membership was still a distant 
possibility but not an immediate target that would translate into  specific policies. For a 
comparison, the policy goal of fast accession to the EU was a key policy target in the context 
of the reforms undertaken by other countries in the region and was supported by concrete 
policy measures. However, it should be added that this hesitance was mutual: while 
immediately after the fall of communism the EU clearly signalled that it regarded the 
countries of central Europe as part of its future enlargement, it was not so fast to make up its 
mind as to how far this enlargement could go. 
In sum, Bulgaria’s reforms until 1997 were hectic and unfocused, did not have a clear 
direction, and featured a stop-and-go course. Many of those that were initiated remained 
unfinished and many important reforms were not initiated at all. Overall, the failure to reach a 
broad agreement (both within the society and among the political forces) on the general 
direction of the reform process amounted to a major coordination failure (as suggested in one 
of our main hypothesis). To understand better the reasons for this uneven and largely 
unsuccessful reform path and the causes for the coordination failure, we now try to look and 
some of the underlying institutional and structural factors, to the political economy of failed 
and delayed reforms, as well as to the role of some external factors. 
   Institutional bottlenecks and structural impediments to the reform process  
  The collapse of communism was accompanied by a collapse of the previously existing 
institutional structures.
7 In fact some of the core formal public institutions (such as the 
constitutional order based on a monoparty political system, the system of central planning) 
were abolished immediately; others (the overwhelming part of the legislation as well as 
virtually all public institutions) were slated for an overhaul. Indeed, some of the new political 
forces considered the dismantling of the old public institutions as their primary policy goal, a 
goal that was assigned far higher priority than the goal of establishing new institutions to 
replace them. As a result, the speed of institutional destruction by far exceeded the speed of 
creating new public institutions.
8 The main negative outcome was that the attacks on the 
public institutions of the communist state often degenerated into an attack on the institutions 
of the state per se. Consequently this forced retreat by the state resulted in a major weakening 
of basic state institutions resulting in an “institutional hiatus”, with severely negative 
consequences for the reform process itself (Kozul-Wright and Rayment, 1997).  
Among the worst affected were the institutions of law and order which, according to 
some of the new political forces, as embodied the institutions of repression of the communist 
system. The police and other parts of the system of national security underwent a series of 
often ill-designed reorganizations and cuts. The reforms of the judiciary system were slow 
and did not contribute to the establishment of strong independent courts. Consequently, law 
enforcement – which had never been a strong point in Bulgaria’s institutional environment
9 – 
rapidly and drastically deteriorated. Criminal activity mushroomed, with organized crime 
(unseen under communism) taking the central stage. Within a relatively short period of time a 
general perception of lawlessness was overwhelming, affecting all facets of everyday life.  
But with respect to the process of market reforms, probably the most important 
negative implication was the failure to institute efficient mechanisms of contract enforcement 
– a key and vital ingredient of the market economy. Importantly, the institutional bottleneck 
in this area lay with implementation, as formally the newly voted laws contained the 
necessary protections of the contracting parties. However, the inefficiency in enforcement by 
both police and courts de facto emasculated the laws: the prevailing public perception was 
that the state was not in a position to enforce this protection.
10 The problems with establishing 
rule of law rule in general and, in particular, the weaknesses in contract enforcement were 
among the important institutional impediments for the progress towards a market economy in 
Bulgaria; they were also a serious deterrent to foreign investors in the first phase of transition. 
  In addition, the general atmosphere of lawlessness and the inefficiency of the 
institutions of law and order was a breeding ground for the mushrooming of numerous illegal 
and semi-legal business activities in the private sector and for the spreading of corrupt 
practices in the public sector. The first steps in the reform and development of the financial 
system provide good examples of such practices.  
As noted, the actual entry to the market was rather lax. The candidates for operating a 
bank had to obtain a license from the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) and the licensing 
procedure was far from being stringent and rigorous. The floor for the minimum required 
capital was rather low (and no proof of origin of the capital was required), and the 
                                                 
7 As noted, we consider institutions in the sense of North (1990), e.g. as comprising the established formal and 
informal “rules of the game”. 
8 Although international comparisons are difficult to make, it appears that other central and east European 
countries had a more cautious approach in this respect, especially regarding the state institutions of law and 
order and in maintaining a continuity in the operations of other important public institutions. 
9 Historically, this institutional feature probably has its origins in the period of Ottoman rule when disobedience 
to the law imposed by the occupying force was regarded as a heroic deed. 
10 Ironically, the existing vacuum in contract enforcement was partly filled by organized crime who offered 
private services in contract enforcement, using criminal methods of extortion. requirements for skill and experience were rather basic. In addition, the absence of 
transparent BNB decision-making rules on licensing opened the way for external pressures 
and corruption. In consequence, many new small private banks (often operated by 
inexperienced teams and in some cases operating capital of dubious origin) rapidly entered 
the Bulgarian financial market (only in 1991-1992, some 15 new private banks came into 
existence). This would not have been a problem if the new banks performed efficient 
financial intermediation and were run in accordance with the principles of prudential 
banking. However, in fact a great number of these new banks were established with the main 
purpose of “tunnelling” funds to their owners. There were various tunnelling schemes but 
probably the favourite one was to borrow on a large scale refinancing funds from BNB and to 
extend these funds as credit to the bank owners or to firms associated with them.
11 Obviously, 
there was no screening whatsoever of these credits and often the credits were extended with 
the clear understanding that they will never be repaid. Some of these credits were intended 
for a risky expansion of business and others were obviously siphoned out for private 
consumption purposes. The emergence of such schemes was facilitated by the close crony 
relations between owners and bank managers (sometimes the same persons), by the 
inadequate prudential regulations (e.g. they failed to control for credit to insiders) and the low 
degree of their enforcement, as well as the inefficient banking supervision. Overall this 
amounted to outright theft of public funds by the bank cronies. 
  However, banking practices in the state-owned banks were not more efficient. 
However, these banks were subject to a different type of interference: they  were prone to 
strong political pressure to allocate soft credit to ailing SOEs. This resulted in the channeling 
of funds to inefficient firms on a large scale: de facto, commercial banks were treated as part 
of the public financial system and a convenient source of hidden subsidies to such firms.
 12  
The microeconomic result of these perverse practices was that the quality of the asset 
portfolios of both state-owned and private commercial banks rapidly deteriorated due to the 
accumulation of large amounts of substandard and non-performing loans. In macroeconomic 
terms, this was equivalent to a highly inefficient pattern of resource allocation with 
detrimental consequences for macroeconomic efficiency. 
  The process of commercial privatization also offers examples of perverse and corrupt 
practices, with harmful consequences for micro- and macroeconomic efficiency. Indeed, the 
absence of transparency in the process of privatization, combined with the existing 
privatization techniques (see Appendix 2), created a breeding ground for rent-seeking and 
abuse. Thus the Privatization Law initially stipulated different possible techniques of 
organizing the sale of an SOE, or particular chunks of it, such as public auctions, tenders, 
public offering of shares as well as a technique that was named “direct negotiations with 
potential buyers” (the latter also included the option of employee-management buy-outs 
(EMBO) at preferential terms). And it was the wide application of this last technique that 
tended to raise most doubts in the eyes of the public as it offered ample scope for possible 
corrupt practices. It basically allowed the potential buyers of a specific enterprise from the 
privatization list (the Agency would announce at the beginning of each year the set SOEs that 
were offered for sale) to approach directly the Agency (in fact, the particular officials dealing 
with this firm) and to declare their interest in buying that firm. In addition, the existence of 
this practice triggered extensive clandestine lobbying by interested parties during the annual 
compilation of the privatization lists. It fact, in the absence of transparency, the (often open) 
abuse of the option of privatization through direct negotiations with potential buyers provided 
all governments in office with the abundant opportunities of personal enrichment and/or of 
                                                 
11 Other types of funds (e.g. deposits collected from the population) were also tunnelled in a similar fashion. 
12 For ideological reasons politicians were reluctant to engage in open subsidies from the budget which were 
considered as a legacy of communist practices. offering generous favours to their political friends. For example, the government would 
change the management team with its own appointees prior to privatization and then it would 
sell the firm to this team through an EMBO.
13 Viewed from a macroeconomic perspective, all 
these practices resulted in massive misallocation of resources.  
  Another structural impediment to reforms in Bulgaria was the low “state capacity” (in 
the sense of Rius and Walle, 2003), which largely amounts to the capacity of the public 
administration to tackle different types of socio-economic policy challenges. In this sense, in 
the early years of transition the Bulgarian public administration obviously had a very low 
capacity to tackle the emerging entirely new for them social and economic problems. Again 
in comparison to other economies in transition (especially the countries of central Europe) 
was at a disadvantage, partly due to legacies of the past and unfavourable initial conditions. 
Thus during the years of communism there was no formal training in economics in any 
Bulgarian university (which was not the case in Hungary, Poland and partly Czechoslovakia) 
and hence both in the government and in the central bank there was a lacuna of trained people 
who could grasp the nature of the ongoing economic processes. Under these circumstances its 
was no wonder that the course of macroeconomic policy was largely shaped under the 
influence of external actors such as the IMF (by contrast, the first economic reform program 
was largely designed by local economists – see Kochanowicz, Kozarewski and Woodwart, 
2004).  
  The arguments and facts presented in this section provide important evidence in 
support of one of our main hypothesis formulated in section 2, namely that the reform process 
in Bulgaria was impaired by structural and institutional bottlenecks.  
 
The role of the IMF in Bulgaria’s first reform attempts 
The IMF has been part of the market reforms in Bulgaria ever since their start. 
However, for quite some time during the early years of transition relations between Bulgaria 
and the IMF were difficult and tense. There was mutual mistrust due to a lack of 
understanding of the actual economic problems on the ground, on the part of the IMF, and of 
the IMF’s modus operandi, on the part of the local authorities (Minassian, 2001). Overall, the 
outcomes of these relations was dismal: the policies agreed upon within the funding 
agreements failed to work and the goals set in the framework of these agreements were not 
achieved. In fact, four consecutive funding agreements with subsequent disbursements 
subject to IMF conditionality between 1991 and 1996 were not brought to a successful end 
(table 2). In the search of the reasons for these failed reform efforts we shall look in more 
detail into the first IMF-supported stabilization program. 
It should be pointed out that upon the fall of communism in 1989, the IMF as an 
institution was totally unprepared (as were the post-communist countries themselves) for the 
unprecedented challenges of the transition from plan to market. Not only were there no 
blueprints for operation in such an environment but the Fund had no country expertise on 
most of these economies that were not its members (Bulgaria being one of them). What the 
IMF had on its shelves were the blueprints of its standard policy and reform packages offered 
to developing countries requesting IMF assistance. Following the prevailing policy paradigm 
of the time, these blueprints were largely dominated by the “Washington Consensus” or what 
is now often referred to as “first generation of reforms” (Fanelli and Popov, 2003). IMF’s 
approach to reforms was inherently neo-liberal, focusing on the necessity to remove all 
policy-generated obstacles to the functioning of markets. In somewhat simplistic terms, this 
amounted to a swift liberalization of the domestic product, financial and labor market as well 
                                                 
13 Much later, in 2001, the Privatization Law was amended, prohibiting the use of this privatization technique 
(including EMBOs). as of current and capital account transaction (trade liberalization being a priory issue). 
Structural issues were not at all part of IMF’s agenda of that time (they were left to be to 
addressed by the World Bank, but without necessarily in coordination with the IMF) while 
institutional and other microeconomic aspects (such as governance), as well as history and 
initial conditions were left out of IMF’s policy agenda altogether. Essentially, these were the 
standard policy packages advocated by the IMF to the former communist countries (including 
Bulgaria) at the start of the transition. 
Following the abrupt default on the foreign debt in March 1990 Bulgaria was facing 
severe balance of payments constraints and approached the IMF for assistance. In the summer 
of 1990 an IMF team started – together with local counterparts – the work on the first funding 
agreements (launched in February-March 1991  – see table 2). Due to the deficiency of 
available analytical capacity by trained economists in the country, the Bulgarian part de facto 
could not be an equal partner in the process of designing the set of the envisaged policy 
measures. Thus the first IMF supported reform agenda was almost entirely designed by the 
IMF team. Besides, the preparation of the agreements took place in the absence of 
transparency and lack of any communication to the public. 
Following IMF mainstream policy approach of the time, Bulgaria’s macroeconomic 
stabilization program was based on targeted changes in the macroeconomic policy mix 
intended to drive the economy into the desired macroeconomic equilibrium (Minassian, 
2001). In turn, these macroeconomic goals were fixed as fixed targets in performance, which 
were the primary components of IMF conditionality in implementation. Thus in the case of 
Bulgaria, where the stabilization effort was based on a floating exchange rate regime with 
money supply being the main nominal anchor, the stabilization program envisaged fixed 
targets for the maximum growth of money supply. In addition, the set of macroeconomic 
policy goals was supplemented with strict targets on the fiscal deficit. Besides, since income 
controls played the role of a secondary nominal anchor, there were targets on the growth of 
wages.  
With respect to its design and contents (as noted earlier, the programme also 
envisaged wide-ranging and fast liberalization of economic activity), Bulgaria’s 
macroeconomic stabilization program resembled closely similar programs launched a year 
earlier (in 1990) first in Poland and then in Czechoslovakia where overall they were 
considered successful. However, in the case of Bulgaria the stabilization effort largely failed 
to produce the expected results. The causes for its failure stem both from design problems 
(technical flaws) and from implementation problems (structural and institutional bottlenecks).  
In the purely technical sense, the programme failed to capture some of the 
specificities of the macroeconomic situation in Bulgaria. First of all the IMF program was 
based on an unrealistic macroeconomic forecast, with a rather optimistic projection of 
economic growth (obviously the Fund did not have a realistic forecasting instrument for the 
Bulgarian economy). This later translated into ambitious but unrealistic macroeconomic 
policy targets that became part of IMF’s conditionality in implementation. Foremost, this 
concerns the rather stringent fiscal targets which turned out to be unattainable in view of the 
depth of the transformational recession (its bottom was in 1991 – table 3) which eroded the 
tax base and the mounting transition-related problems in tax collection. In addition, the 
instruments of monetary control available at the disposal of the central bank were rather 
primitive (mostly credit ceilings on the credit expansion of commercial banks) turned out to 
be ill designed and inefficient.
14 Consequently, the targets with respect to money supply were 
also largely missed. The failure to meet the stringent technical policy targets set in the 
                                                 
14 One purely technical reason was that they applied only to credits in local currency and not to credit 
denominated in foreign currencies. program as IMF conditionality was the reason for the suspension of funding by the IMF 
already in mid-1991. But apart from the unrealistic technical targets, the very design of the 
stabilization program was not appropriate for the economic conditions in Bulgarian at that 
moment. It was rather narrowly focused on macroeconomic policy and performance and 
failed to grasp the complexity of the economic problems the country was facing 
(microeconomic and institutional factors were not addressed altogether).  
Structural problems of the context played no lesser role for the failure of the 
stabilization program. With the benefit of hindsight it appears that the rather unfavourable 
initial conditions ( such as an extremely high dependence on a fading market, inflexible 
domestic manufacturing base, very high domestic macroeconomic imbalances, the available 
human capital in the country) implied a longer adjustment period than was targeted in this 
program. In fact the rapid economic liberalization (particularly in trade) likely reinforced the 
shock to the economy thus contributing negatively to the achievement of the macroeconomic 
targets.  
Ownership problems also affected negatively the implementation phase. The fact that 
the program was almost entirely designed by the IMF meant at the same time that for those 
responsible for its implementation it largely remained as a policy prescription imposed from 
the outside and policy makers were not committed to their implementation. In addition, due 
to the weak state capacity, its philosophy and methodology largely remained as a black box 
and likely there was no clear understanding of the workings of the transmission channels 
through which policy actions translated into actual economic performance. Moreover, very 
little was done to explain the goals of the program to the public so wide ownership of the 
reform was simply out of the question. More generally, despite its close involvement in 
Bulgaria’s reforms, the IMF failed to assist in resolving the existing coordination problem 
with respect to the implementation of market reforms in Bulgaria. 
Thus it is the combination of these numerous and complex factors that can explain 
why the first stabilization effort in Bulgarian failed while similar programs were more or less 
successful in other countries. For example, comparing with Poland, a very important 
difference is the ownership issue: in contrast to Bulgaria, the first Polish stabilization 
program was almost entirely designed in Poland, by Polish economists and experts, who not 
only knew much better the local conditions and context but also actively supported the effort 
and publicised its achievements (Kochanowicz, Kozarewski and Woodwart, 2004). An 
important difference both from Poland and Czechoslovakia were the initial conditions. First, 
both countries had a much smaller dependence on trade with USSR and consequently the 
depth of their transformational recession was lower. State capacity was higher in both cases 
and the institutional environment was generally more supportive to reforms. Public attitude in 
the two countries was also more supportive as there was a broad majority clearly demanding 
a radical break with the past. Czechoslovakia embarked on the reform process virtually with 
no macroeconomic imbalances which provided its policy makers with much wider room for 
manoeuvre. By contrast, Poland had just gone through a hear hyperinflation but this produced 
much wider public support for the stabilization effort. Notably, in both countries the initial 
macroeconomic targets were partly missed (but not by the same margin as in Bulgaria) but 
the programs were generally regarded as successful. 
Problems of this sort discussed above accompanied the design and implementation of 
the subsequent three Fund-supported reform programs none of which was successfully 
finalized (table 2). Broadly speaking, the core problems accompanying their implementation 
remained the same: design flaws, unrealistic targets, disregard of the context, f ailure to 
address institutional and microeconomic factors, weak ownership, general mistrust by the 
public. In the technical sense, the targets set in the programs were missed soon after their 
launching and this triggered the suspension of funding. However, over time, there was a gradual change in attitude on both sides and an 
evolution in the approach to reform by the IMF. One aspect that became increasingly 
apparent both to the IMF and to a number of local experts was the fact that the root causes of 
the d ismal macroeconomic performance (including the persistently high inflation) were 
largely microeconomic in nature. Thus weak governance and soft budget constraints bred 
financial indiscipline; over time the resultant quasi-fiscal deficit translated into an open fiscal 
deficit and its partial monetization fed into high inflation. Thus issues such as governance and 
institutional change gradually started to appear in the IMF supported programs, although they 
still played subordinate role compared to the macroeconomic targets. The 1996 Fund-
supported program was the first which addressed specifically problems like the rehabilitation 
of the banking system and the restructuring of the large loss-making SOEs. However, as 
discussed below, by escalation of the financial crisis in late 1996 and the fall of the BSP 
government in early 1997 radically changed the policy priorities and meant the end of this 
agreement.  
 
Delayed reforms as a rational choice 
The question that we shall try address now is, whether there is a possible rational 
explanation and interpretation of the policies during this period, and especially to the question 
why some key reforms were delayed? In fact, another way of looking at the question “Why 
reform?” is to address the question “Why no-reform?” In what follows we try to offer some 
possible clues to this question using some of the results of the recent literature on policy 
reform. In addition, we try to relate our analysis to the stakeholder groups identified above 
and their interactions. 
The initial phases of transition in Bulgaria raise some intriguing questions related to 
the course of policy reforms and we shall try to analyze one of them, that seems central to the 
reform failure: Why was it so difficult to establish political support (more generally, a core 
consensus within a sufficiently large part of the society) on some of the key reforms that 
needed to be implemented, in the first place, the restructuring of the inefficient enterprise 
sector? The failure to do so, as noted earlier, was one o f the primary sources of the 
subsequent financial crisis.  
One ex ante complication of the needed reforms was the large degree of uncertainty 
associated with their outcome, especially in the short and medium run. While in the long run 
everybody could expect to be better off as a result of the transition from plan to market (and 
this was the basis for the overwhelming political support for the abolition of communism), 
the short- and medium-term outcomes were surrounded by a considerable individual-specific 
uncertainty for those who would have been directly affected by these reforms, namely, 
enterprise workers. Thus, if an unviable SOE was to be closed, the prospects for workers to 
find another job or to start their own business were rather shaky, and even if they would 
manage to relocate, they could expect a lowering of their real incomes due to the ongoing 
restructuring of relative prices. Similar uncertainties existed in the case when a firm was due 
to be privatized shortly.
 15  
The model of resistance to reform in the presence of individual uncertainty developed 
by Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) provides a useful analytical framework for the analysis of 
the policy process in a situation of this type. This model analyzes the policy choice (to reform 
or not to reform) in an economy where the reform is associated with the relocation of labor, 
                                                 
15 One of the factors reinforcing the uncertainty related to the outcomes of enterprise restructuring – in contrast 
to central Europe which had similar starting positions – was the hesitance of FDI (one of the main engines of 
firm restructuring) to flow into Bulgaria in this period. But the causal effects are more complex as the low 
inflow of FDI reflected the generally unfavourable business and investment climate in the country in this initial 
phase of transition (figure 1) coupled with an unsettled foreign debt issue. and the workers face individual uncertainties about the outcomes: they do not know whether 
they will win or lose as a result of the reform. According to its results, some reforms that 
would have been popular  ex post may not enjoy support  ex ante depending on the 
uncertainties regarding the identities of the gainers and losers of the reforms. 
The model setup and its results can be easily extended to a more general set of 
assumptions, in particular, as regards the type of policy reform, so that to adapt it to the 
economic, political and social environment of an economy in the early phases of transition 
from plan to market, as Bulgaria in the early 1990s. Consider thus, a reform package 
combining trade liberalization (as in the original Fernandez-Rodrik model) with enterprise 
restructuring and restructuring of foreign debt. Enterprise restructuring measures (including 
privatization) can be identified with the hardening of firms’ budget constraints to force firms 
to operate more efficiently; ultimately, this comes to the relocation of production factors (in 
the first place labor) from inefficient to more firms (sectors). Resolving the foreign debt issue 
and resumption of debt service in a highly indebted economy implies that the “debt-adjusted” 
equilibrium real exchange rate be lower than the “unadjusted” market rate (the equilibrium 
rate relevant to a situation when the debt is serviced by new borrowing) (Fabella, 1996). 
Since debt service is to be financed by the current account, the real exchange rate would have 
to readjust to a lower position and the “price” of such an adjustment usually is a reduced level 
of domestic demand and output to match the real depreciation of the exchange rate.  
Both of these policy measures affect post-reform relative prices and can thus be 
interpreted in the framework of the Fernandez-Rodrik model. Firstly, they are associated with 
a major restructuring of the economy, implying even greater relocation of l abor between 
sectors. Secondly, due to the superimposition of a real exchange rate realignment, they are 
likely to induce even greater changes in domestic relative prices. Hence, it is easy to show, 
that the general outcomes of the Fernandez-Rodrik model w ould also hold under these 
assumptions.  
The formation of a voting majority in support of the reform is assumed to be a key 
factor for its implementation. The main theoretical outcome of the Fernandez and Rodrik 
(1991) model is that a situation when the individual gainers or losers of the reform cannot be 
clearly identified in advance is likely to be associated with the inability to form a voting 
majority in support the needed reform. Hence the likely policy outcome in this situation is 
preservation of the status quo.
16 This outcome in fact provides the evidence in support of one 
of our main hypotheses formulated in section 2.  
Another puzzling question is why it took so long – compared to other countries with 
similar starting positions in the reform process  – to introduce and sustain policies 
guaranteeing macroeconomic stability. While macroeconomic stabilization was always a 
central declared goal of macroeconomic policy ever since the start of transition, actual 
policies were often disastrous with respect to their outcome. As discussed earlier, the main 
flaw in the economic policy mix was toleration of a huge quasi-fiscal deficit and its 
subsequent monetization; this gave rise to persistently high inflation which escalated into 
hyperinflation in January-February 1997. 
                                                 
16 In retrospective, this is exactly what happened to enterprise reform in Bulgaria until 1997: no government 
undertook a major restructuring of the ailing SOEs; instead they continued to operate under soft budget 
constraints and had access to various (direct and implicit) subsidies which helped them run as going concerns, at 
least for several years. Privatization in general was not assigned a high priority; the mass privatization program 
did not lead to immediate changes in the patterns of governance and performance. Ironically – again in hindsight 
– the individual-specific outcome for SOEs’ workers likely was not too much different from what would have 
been under a speedier and more radical enterprise reform: between 1989 and 1993, 40% of industrial employees 
lost their jobs permanently (Figure 2). The “war of attrition” model suggested by Alesina and Drazen (1991) seeks for a 
rational explanation of delayed stabilizations in a similar macroeconomic setup.  In this 
model it is assumed that the underlying cause of macroeconomic instability is a chronic fiscal 
imbalance and hence the needed policy course is fiscal consolidation. Stabilization is 
identified with the balancing of the budget; this is achieved by an increase in taxes which are 
distributed unevenly across socioeconomic groups. Solving the model yields the conclusion 
that macroeconomic stabilization in this case is delayed because of significant distributional 
implications of the needed policy reform. In a heterogeneous society when socioeconomic 
groups may have to bear a disproportionate share of the reform burden each group attempts to 
shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups (“war of attrition”) and this delays the 
timing of implementation of the reform.  
The Alesina and Drazen (1991) model provides another rational explanation of the 
policy difficulties in stabilizing the Bulgarian economy in the initial phase of transition. 
Bulgaria’s public finances were running a large and chronic open deficit (table 3). In the 
extended definition (including contingent fiscal liabilities of the government), this deficit was 
much greater, probably double the open deficit (exact estimates are not available). Balancing 
public finances required a major adjustment, which would have been extremely painful, 
regardless of whether the adjustment would have been effectuated on the revenue or 
expenditure side. On the expenditure side, arresting the expansion of the open and quasi-
fiscal expenditure would have necessitated to discontinue with the open and implicit 
subsidies to ailing SOEs, resulting in their immediate liquidation and massive layoffs. On the 
revenue side, this would have necessitated to raise substantially tax revenue in a situation 
when the old tax system had collapsed while a new one was not yet in place; apart from the 
political constraints, raising tax revenue might have been technically impossible. 
Ex post, fiscal sustainability in Bulgaria (in the sequence of hyperinflation followed 
by swift disinflation) was achieved through a de facto write-off of public debt and quasi-debt 
(eroded by hyperinflation) enforced on claim holders of such debt. Importantly, this also 
meant a write-off of private debt denominated in domestic currency. Ultimately, the costs 
were passed on to all holders of assets denominated in domestic currency (the “creditors”), 
the largest category among them being household savings. This outcome can be interpreted as 
a one-off tax levied by the government on the group of creditors, while the group of private 
debtors actually were granted a one-off tax relief.
17 In distributional terms the “reduction of 
the level of taxation” of the debtors is at the expense of a “rise in the level of taxation of the 
group of creditors”. Such an interpretation, clearly defining two groups – “winners” and 
“losers” of the reform, fits comfortably into the framework of the Alesina and Drazen (1991) 
model.
18 As suggested by this model, the anticipated disproportionate sharing of the reform 
burden by these groups gives rise to a “war of attrition” which, in turn, provides a rational 
explanation of the delayed stabilization. This result provides the evidence in support of our 
second main hypothesis formulated in section 2. 
In fact, the two model interpretations given above in the main look at the rationale 
behind the delay of one and the same policy reform  – the restructuring of the enterprise 
sector, which ultimately was one of the main primary sources of financial and 
macroeconomic instability. However, they look at it from different angles: firstly, from the 
                                                 
17 As the creditors paid for both public and private debt write-off, they were taxed more than would have been 
the case in the absence of private debt. 
18 In a similar vein, Nenovsky and Rizopoulos (2003) argue that the monetary regime change in 1997 was the 
result of a fight for power (over the appropriation and redistribution of common wealth) between different 
groups of national and international debtors and creditors. The monetary regime change reversed the position of 
dominance in the Bulgarian economy: before 1997 it was debtor dominated while after 1997 it became creditor 
dominated. point of view of the implied uncertainty and, secondly, from the point of view of its 
distributional consequences. These two models thus provide consistent and complementary 
rational choice explanations of the reluctance of policy makers to go ahead with the needed 
reforms which was one of the main causes of the overall reform failure.
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  The outcomes  
The uneven course and piecemeal nature of the Bulgarian reforms in the early phases 
of transition are reflected in the country’s dismal economic performance in this period. With 
a cumulative GDP decline of some 27% through 1993, Bulgaria experienced one of the most 
severe transformational recessions among all central and eastern European countries.  Only 
during the first two years of transition (1990-1991) Bulgaria’s GDP dropped by almost 20% 
while gross industrial output fell by 35% (table 3 and figure 1). Although there were no 
massive policy-driven layoffs, the output collapse had grave labor market implications, and 
the first years of transition were marked by an unprecedented deterioration of the situation in 
the labor market. Thus only between 1989 and 1992 the net job losses in the economy 
amounted to more than 1 mln people which was some 23% of the total employment before 
transition and around 12% of its population. The pool of unemployed (something that was 
non-existent in the past) was rapidly expanding (figure 2). The most affected segment of the 
labor market was industrial employment: apart from the open job cuts, many manufacturing 
firms facing financial difficulties stopped paying  wages or paid reduced wages, with 
considerable. Despite the extensive labor shedding, the fall in industrial employment lagged 
behind that in the industrial output (table 3). However, the unemployment statistics for this 
period may not be quite accurate, a s many firms forced part of their workforce to take 
extended involuntary unpaid leave. Although such persons did not formally qualify as 
unemployed, de facto they were without a gainful job. 
No notable progress towards macroeconomic stabilization could be achieved in this 
period. The policy measures that were undertaken could not achieve their goals largely due to 
some specific, transition-related factors of macroeconomic instability. Thus, apart from the 
open fiscal deficit (which was largely monetized) another important source of inflationary 
pressure was the large quasi-fiscal deficit in the economy. The core roots of the quasi-fiscal 
deficit lay in the huge financial losses incurred by the unviable SOEs (as a result of their lost 
market and inability to adjust to market conditions) which in the course of time transformed 
into open fiscal deficit. Maintaining such firms as going concerns (under the pressure by 
interest groups) meant that their losses had to be covered from external sources, at least 
partly. As noted, open budgetary subsidies were deemed unacceptable for this purpose for 
ideological reasons. However, there were alternative ways of channeling funds to ailing 
firms. One of them was the toleration of firm arrears in their payments to the budget. This de 
facto was equivalent to a direct budgetary subsidy (moreover, not conditioned on 
performance) that added directly to the fiscal deficit. Another important channel were the soft 
credits extended by state-owned banks. However, as most of these credits were not serviced, 
over time the losses of the SOEs were de facto channeled to the banks. When the state later 
intervened to bail out the failing banks, the losses of these banks were recognized as public 
                                                 
19 In fact, the socio-economic and political context in Bulgaria, the policy course and the observed outcomes of 
(the lack of) reforms are also consistent with other models in this strand of the literature. Thus Cukierman, 
Edwards and Tabellini (1992) derive the result that political polarization (very pronounced in Bulgaria in this 
phase) increases the probability of blocking the reforms (which entirely consistent with what happened in 
Bulgaria). Similarly, Murphy and Sturzenegger (1996) arrive at the result that the more ideological the political 
parties a re (another typical feature of the Bulgarian political system at the time), the more likely it is that 
reforms would be blocked (as indeed happened). liabilities and thus added to the persistently high fiscal deficit (table 3). The fiscalization-
cum-monetization of the huge quasi-fiscal deficit inevitably translated into high inflation.  
To sum up, one of the reasons for the failure to achieve macroeconomic stabilization 
was the fact that the policies in this phase of transition did not address comprehensively the 
problem of the quasi-fiscal deficit. In the sense of the models of rational choice discussed 
above, the authorities chose this policy course (rather than the more rapid restructuring of the 
enterprise sector) to avoid major social conflicts, and under pressure from interest groups. 
However, high inflation and macroeconomic instability were the price that the whole society 
had to pay for this delay. In the initial stage, the IMF (which was one of the main drivers of 
the policy reform) was largely focused on macro issue and likely failed to identify the core 
roots of the problem. By the time when it did, it was perhaps too late to avert the crisis. 
As noted, these policies were equivalent to the preservation of soft budget constraints 
which, in turn, held back enterprise restructuring. Besides, the toleration of non-payments by 
the state (an important institutional failure) instigated widespread financial discipline in the 
economy. In the final run, the negative effects of these policies accumulated in the banking 
system in the form of bad loans. Notably, both state-owned and private banks were adversely 
affected, although for different reasons. In the state-owned banks this was largely the 
outcome of state intervention in the allocation of credit whereas private banks suffered from 
the corrupt practices of insiders. 
  Ironically, the inconsistent policies that tried to address the issue of the snowballing 
bad loans, only served to aggravate the problems. Both in 1991 and in 1992 the authorities 
decided to enact a partial debt relief of old enterprise credit (this operation covered about 25 
per cent of the non-performing bad loans allocated before 1990). These steps were meant 
mainly as financial assistance to troubled enterprises and were not aimed at cleaning up the 
banks’ portfolios, which at that time did not show signs of trouble. However, the program did 
not have a clear strategy (the debt relief was not conditioned on performance improvement)   
and this gave rise to severe moral-hazard problems. This inconsistent and partial policy – 
which did not lead to a once-and-for-all solution of the problem – gave the wrong signals to 
enterprises. In spite of the fact that it covered only a small portion of the SOEs, it created the 
overwhelming expectations of an “all forgiving” policy on behalf of the state, the outcome of 
which was that practically all SOEs gradually stopped servicing their old bank credits. 
Indeed, this expectation translated into a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The sharp deterioration of the banks’ portfolios in 1993 caused by the upsurge of bad 
loans raised the political pressure for a new action. After heated political debates, in 
December 1993 the Bulgarian parliament adopted a law on the settlement of old bad loans of 
Bulgarian SOEs. This was a large-scale operation covering enterprise debt of over 3 bn US 
dollars (some 28% of Bulgarian GDP that year) which were replaced in the banks balance 
sheets with 25 year government bonds which the enterprise debt to the banks was converted 
into direct debt to the state. However, given the circumstances, this extremely costly 
operation could not resolve to accumulated problems. It only addressed one part of the 
accumulated stock but did to deal with either the total stock, and more importantly, with the 
flow problem. The problem was that there was a large amount of “new” bad loans 
(accumulated after 1990 and hence not eligible for conversion) and that these new bad loans 
were rapidly increasing.  
The weak institutional environment was an important factor for the escalation of the 
economic problems. Thus bank supervision was poorly designed and not endowed with 
sufficient power to enforce prudential banking practices; there were also important loopholes 
in prudential regulations (OECD, 1997). A crucial flaw of the judiciary was the absence of 
effective mechanisms of securing contract enforcement, and this was a key factor for the 
proliferation of financial indiscipline (OECD, 1997). A bankruptcy law was only adopted in June 1994 (before that there was no legislation dealing with the issue); anyway its adoption 
did not make much difference due to weak enforcement and increasing political pressure. 
Important public institutions (such as the judiciary and the central bank) were in fact subject 
to strong political pressure which caused serious distortions in their actions. The public 
administration was in a state of a permanent reshuffle: each new government initiated 
sweeping layoffs, bringing in its own cronies. The absence of stable rules and norms and the 
lack of transparency in the working of the public administration bred endemic corruption. 
The lack of progress in stabilization had grave consequences for the living standards 
of the population. The combination of falling output and stubbornly high inflation remained 
continuously eroded the real value of both current income and of the monetary assets held in 
domestic currency. The drop in real incomes in these years was really unprecedented: 
between 1989 and 1996 the average real wages in the country dropped by some 60%.  
The first years of transition were also marked by recurrent open social unrest which 
took the form of frequent strikes. While such an attitude to the ongoing reforms partly 
reflected the eagerness of the population to take advantage of the newly acquired democratic 
freedom, it was mostly driven by the rapid deterioration in the living standards of many 
people and the dismal situation in the labor market. The street protests often acted as a 




BSP won the absolute majority at parliamentary elections held in December 1994 on 
the populist ticket of “moderating the social costs of transition”, a slogan that – given the 
high unemployment and spreading impoverishment – had a wide popular appeal. The BSP 
government that took office was the first one after 1990 that enjoyed a one-party majority in 
parliament and thus BSP had all the power to implement its policies. The party at that time 
was dominated its non-reformist wing and the latter pushed through a package of measures 
based on the concept of “public correction” which de facto meant more state interference in 
the economy. In the main this amounted to extensive price regulation (seeking to slow down 
the inflation), wider regulation of economic activity (licenses and permits) and, probably 
most important, wide direct interference in the allocation of credit by state-owned banks.  The 
BSP government de facto regarded these banks as part of the system of public finance which, 
moreover, was under its direct control (rather than under the control of the parliament) and 
openly abused this usurped power. These practices culminated in 1995 with the public statement 
by the then Minister of Industry advising SOEs not to service their bank credits if they found 
themselves in financial difficulties. 
After several years of deep depression, the years 1994 and 1995 were marked by a 
meager recovery (table 3), and the government attempted to take credit for that, claiming that 
this reflected the success of its policies. However, this recovery did not have any sound 
fundamentals as it was mostly driven by these unsustainable policies. In fact, in its attempt to 
revitalize the ailing economy, the government was pumping large amounts of public funds 
into it, a policy that over time only generated more instability. 
In the mean time, the situation in the financial system was rapidly deteriorating, 
accumulating the combined negative effect of past and present inconsistent policies. The series 
of financial bailouts undertaken in the previous years added to the mounting fiscal problems, 
resulting in the direct fiscalization of the quasi fiscal deficits accumulated in the corporate 
and banking systems. The overall outcome was a sharp deterioration in the public sector 
financial balance and a skyrocketing domestic public debt which became a grave burden to 
the economy (table 3). Not only were the increasing public sector borrowings persistently 
crowding out business investment but the snowballing interest payments by the budget started to crowd out all non-interest budget expenditure (figure 3), while the government was forced 
to maintain a large primary surplus (figure 4). The fiscal burden was aggravate by the high 
nominal interest rates during this period (table 3)
20, in itself a result of the chronic 
macroeconomic instability. Although the resumption of the foreign debt service in 1995 (after 
Bulgaria reached a debt restructuring deal with the London Club in 1994) added to the overall 
debt burden, it was the service of domestic public debt that caused most pain: in 1996 
domestic interest payment reached almost 17 per cent of GDP! In such a situation the fiscal 
authorities could not avoid chronic large budget deficits and the financing of this deficit 
resulted in its almost complete monetization.  
Simultaneously, the escalation of bad loans led to a sharp deterioration of the banks’ 
portfolios: at the end of 1995, some 75% of the outstanding commercial bank loans were 
classified as sub-standard or non-performing. Public confidence in the banking system started 
to erode in late 1995 with some banks experiencing liquidity problems. The panic which at 
first was only confined within the banks that were most affected by liquidity problems 
gradually escalated with the subsequent closure of several banks and towards mid-1996 took 
the form of a full-scale run on the whole banking system bringing about massive withdrawals 
of deposits. At the end of 1996, 15 commercial banks (both state-owned and private) were 
placed under conservatorship by the central bank which initiated bankruptcy procedures 
against them. 
Under a free-floating exchange rate regime, as was the case in Bulgaria, it is the 
exchange rate that absorbs instantaneously the macroeconomic adjustments caused by 
financial pressure or external disturbances. Thus, unsurprisingly, the collapse of the banking 
system provoked massive currency substitution and capital flight, e xerting a strong 
downward pressure on the currency and causing a drain of the official forex reserves (table 
3). The final and desperate attempt by the monetary authorities to arrest the crisis was to raise 
the basic interest rate, its main policy instrument: in May 1996 the central bank set its basic 
interest rate at 280 per cent (annual compound) and in September at 1450 per cent! However,  
by that time the government and the monetary authorities had completely lost their credibility 
and these moves could not calm down the financial markets. Moreover, the subsequent 
monetary injection (imposed by the government through a special law) wiped out the effect 
of the interest rate hikes. 
The collapse of the banking system aggravated the fiscal crisis creating another 
vicious circle. Due to the liquidity crisis in the banking system, by mid-1996 most new 
government security issues were under-subscribed and issues remained partially unsold. In 
turn, the Ministry of Finance which also experienced cash shortage started to pay the interest 
due on outstanding securities through newly issued ones reducing the cash supply to the 
banks which further worsened their liquidity problems. Consequently, the Ministry of 
Finance was forced to apply more often for cash advances from the central bank whereas the 
BNB often intervened as a first buyer of government securities. Apart from that, the central 
bank increased the uncollateralized refinancing of the commercial banks. Finally, a special 
law was passed in December, obliging the central bank to extend a huge one-time direct 
credit to the budget (of BGL 800 bn, equivalent to 45% of GDP in 1996). It was this 
enormous monetary injection that spurred a hyperinflationary hike at the turn of 1996. 
The chaos in the financial system (and in the economy as a whole), the eroding real 
incomes as well as the steadily deteriorating expectations triggered a plunge in economic 
activity: the cumulative GDP drop in 1996-1997 amounted to some 15% (table 3). The crisis 
resulted in significant loses of financial wealth for a great number of people and provoked 
                                                 
20 High nominal interest rates imply not only high interest payments on short-term government debt but also 
accelerated real amortisation of long-term debt as larger shares of real repayment were made at earlier phases of 
the debt. mass street riots. In January 1997 the ruling socialist government was forced to resign. A 




  5. From crisis to successful reforms (1997-2004) 
   
  The new context 
The 1996-1997 crisis was a dividing line in Bulgaria’s reforms. It was a devastating 
economic collapse: apart from the hyperinflation which was ruinous for the savings of 
ordinary households, it produced a deep recession, a chaos in the financial system resulting in 
the closure of some 15 banks, and bankrupt public finances. The crisis resulted in further 
impoverishment and deepening of the social stratification, and brought about widespread 
frustration with the policies pursued during the first phases of transition. The biggest losers 
were the low and middle-income classes, those that had held assets and savings in domestic 
currency. By the time of the crisis and during its course, many of them lost a big chunk of 
what they had to lose (both in terms of wealth and in terms of job security). In the public 
perception these losses were due to flawed policies, largely associated with the Socialist party 
which not only was in power at the time of the crisis but also either led, or supported most of 
the governments in office during the first phases of transition.  
It could be noted that while reflecting the negative outcomes of failed policies, the 
overthrow of the BSP government was at the same time a demonstration of the progress in 
the process of democratisation in Bulgaria after the fall of communism. Although the people 
took to the streets in masses to protest, the ousting of the government basically took place in 
the absence of violence. The changeover of power was in full compliance with the acting 
constitution: after the resignation of the BSP government, the President appointed a caretaker 
government with the mandate to prepare early elections. 
The general disillusionment with the previous policies translated into broad public 
support for a radical change in the course of economic reforms. This switch in political 
sentiment change in orientation partly reflected the ongoing societal shifts. In the runup to the 
crisis and, especially in its aftermath, there was a massive shake-up in stakeholder groups. 
With the advance in privatization and the ongoing liquidation of inefficient SOEs, the groups 
of SOE employees and managers (important stakeholder groups with clearly defined interests 
in the initial phase of transition) gradually lost their clout and importance in society. Trade 
unions weakened further due to their inability to act and defend the interests of their 
members, especially before and during the crisis, and have not been able to recover their 
previous political positions ever since; politics returned to the political parties. At the same 
time, new stakeholder groups were gaining both in numbers and in importance. This 
especially concerns the numerous and rapidly growing category of small entrepreneurs – 
owners and managers of small businesses  (table 5). During the course of transition, small 
entrepreneurs gradually emerged as one of the most influential stakeholder groups. 
Subsequently, the growing number of foreign investors and the emerging class of domestic 
big entrepreneurs and executives also gained in importance. Private entrepreneurs had a 
vested interest in a stable and predictable economic environment, transparent policy and 
political stability. The non-governmental sector as well as the media, which were rather 
active during the crisis, subsequently strengthened their positions. 
During the crisis and in its aftermath, the political symbol of change was the main 
opposition party (formally, coalition of parties), UDF. During the crisis the UDF led the 
political discontent, advocating discontinuation of the previous course of muddling through 
and the swift introduction of sweeping policy reforms. Even though the envisaged policy change was an obvious turn to the right, it was also s upported by many people with 
traditional leftwing orientation who had suffered from the previous policy course. The 
caretaker government appointed in January 1997 was headed by the leader of one of the small 
parties that participated in UDF and actually gave the start of some of the new reforms. 
Consequently, the early elections held in June 1997 resulted in a crashing defeat for the 
socialists and a full-fledged victory of the UDF, which gained the absolute majority in these 
elections and formed its own government (see Appendix 1). Indeed, for the first time after the 
fall of communism, Bulgaria had a strong government, which enjoyed a comfortable 
parliamentary majority.  
The crisis also triggered a major overhaul in the Socialist party itself. The policies of 
non-reform wing which dominated the government were completely discredited and this 
faction was ousted from the party’s top positions. The reformist wing took full control of the 
party and this brought about a major change in its own political and policy orientation: 
domestically the new leadership supported the course of market reforms and externally it was 
an advocate of rapid accession to the EU. 
Equally important, significant changes took place in the country’s external 
environment. The declared domestic political will to go ahead with radical economic reforms 
and changes in the direction of policies, as well as their strong public backing (as evidenced 
by the 1997 elections) triggered a positive response by several important external agents. In 
the first place this was the IMF, which offered financial support, but under the conditions of a 
clear role in macroeconomic management (discussed below).  
The other major external agent was the EU (represented by the European 
Commission). As noted, in the beginning of the 1990s the EU itself was unprepared for the 
fall of communism and had not made up its mind as regards the scope and direction of its 
further enlargement. Besides, it was too preoccupied with the introduction of the single 
market in 1992 and the expected accession of three new members (Austria, Finland and 
Sweden which joined in 1995). However, the views on the possible future eastern 
enlargement gradually took shape, with Bulgaria entering the scene as a prospective new 
member. Geopolitical factors that played a role in this re-orientation of the EU: it wanted to 
establish islands of stability in the highly politically unstable Balkan region. In this regard, 
despite its economic problems, in terms of political reforms, democratisation and ethnic 
tolerance Bulgaria featured prominently compared to its neighbors in the Western Balkans. 
The real turning point in the relations with the EU was the decision to start accession 
negotiations with Bulgaria in 1999 (after Bulgaria offered full support to NATO’s operation 
in Yugoslavia), the first clear signal that the EU viewed Bulgaria as its future member. Later 
on, a similar signal came from NATO.  
These unambiguous external signals put an end to the gravity vacuum that had 
emerged after 1989. On the one hand, they meant that the West had finally recognized the 
country as part and parcel of its patrimony and was willing to take a much more active role in 
defining and shaping its politics and policies. But, on the other hand, this was also a positive 
response to the radical re-orientation in Bulgaria’s domestic and foreign policy and politics 
after 1997. In turn, these signals provided a powerful support for the domestic political forces 
with a pro-western political orientation.  
All these changes in the context amounted to a major “structural break” in the driving 
forces of Bulgarian reforms in the sense of a major change in the underlying structural 
relations that drove the reform process and determined its direction. Taken together, these 
factors steered the overall re-orientation of Bulgaria’s politics and policy and, more generally, 
the beginning of its “switching” from an eastern to a western periphery. 
 
 The political economy of policy change 
  We now turn to the motivational aspect of the reform effort in the years after 1997 
with questions such as the following: Is there an interpretation based on rational choice that 
could explain the change in policy course in this later phase of reforms? What was the main 
motivational driving force behind the reform drive in this phase? How can we explain the 
stark contrast between reform failure and reform success in virtually the same society, just 
several years down the road? One of the puzzling issues in this regard is why reform policies 
that were impossible to implement in the first phase due to strong public resistance, were 
welcomed and applauded by the public in the next phase? 
To address this issue we turn to another theoretical work in the literature on the 
positive economics of policy reform, that by Drazen and Grilli (1993). The model of Drazen 
and Grilli suggests a rational choice explanation why major economic crises may serve as 
catalysts of reforms and provide theoretical arguments in support of their claim that “the 
welfare losses associated with economic distortions and crises enable societies to enact 
measure that would be impossible to enact in less distortionary circumstances”. Thus, if 
society is heterogeneous and there is no consensus between interest groups over the reform 
path and the distribution of the costs and benefits associated with it (as was the case in 
Bulgaria), a crisis may be the only way to induce necessary policy changes.
21 The more 
severe the crisis (and the higher the inflation), the more likely it is that reforms (stabilization 
policies) will finally be implemented. To put it differently, in a situation of a crisis the costs 
incurred by the population, including the interest groups that will be most affected by 
reforms, become comparable to the costs of reforms and political support of the reforms starts 
to grow.  
In fact, the Drazen and Grilli interpretation fits almost perfectly the situation in 
Bulgaria at the peak of the financial crisis in 1996-1997. Public finances were in a chronic 
and widening deficit, largely due to the escalating open redemption of contingent public 
fiscal liabilities. As a result of the surfacing into the open of the large quasi-fiscal deficit, 
public debt was snowballing but there was no consensus in society how to share the costs of 
the needed fiscal adjustment. As discussed above, the deficit was financed by printing money 
and the huge one-off operation of deficit financing through monetary emission that took place 
in the final months of 1996 gave rise to the hyperinflationary hike in January 1997. At that 
point, when inflation was threatening to get out of control completely, finally a political 
agreement (reflecting the changing attitudes throughout the whole society) was reached on 
the subsequent stabilization package. This outcome provides strong evidence in support of 
one of the main hypothesis formulated in section 2. 
To understand the driving forces of the major policy switch and the scale of public 
support for this change one needs also to take into consideration switch the endogeneity of 
the policy process in a situation of a dynamic political equilibrium. In the stream of literature 
on the positive economics of policy reform it has often been pointed out that policies as well 
as the attitude of interest groups in society are not necessarily exogenously determined 
(Krueger, 1993): on the one side market responses to economic policies affect the political 
equilibrium and can induce changes in policy; on the other, economic interests are often 
functions of past policies. Thus both policies and the political equilibrium (support of or 
resistance to policies) can change endogenously over time. In the case of Bulgaria the attitude 
of the main interest groups, including the attitude and economic interests of those that 
resisted reforms most fiercely in the first phases of transition, were rapidly changing during 
the crisis as they were beginning to realize that past policies were leading to a catastrophe. 
                                                 
21 Subsequently, Drazen (1996) suggested a theoretical framework that allows to apply a common approach and 
methodology to the above issue and to the “war of attrition” model, arriving basically at similar results and 
conclusions. This was equivalent to a major shift in the political equilibrium in the country towards 
reform-oriented policies.  
And finally, one cannot overestimate the importance of the external agents in 
legimimizing the change in policy direction and in providing a solid support for local 
politicians to follow this course after 1997. Notably, the realistic prospects for EU 
membership (regarded by local politicians as an impending reward for policy success) and 
the disciplining role of accession negotiations have been a crucial vehicle for pushing through 
a broad institutional, legislative and regulatory reform agenda. Similarly, the IMF had a 
prominent role in instituting policies of fiscal restraint in extremely harsh economic 
conditions, which has been the key factor of macroeconomic stability after 1997. It would be 
fare to say, that in the absence of these extremely strong external anchors, the risks of 
abandoning the reform course and slipping back into policy havoc would have been much 
greater. 
 
The new policy course 
  The change in government in mid-1997 was accompanied by a major change in 
macroeconomic policy and the subsequent introduction of comprehensive structural and 
institutional reforms.  
The key driver of the new reform effort in Bulgaria was again the IMF; however, this 
time its involvement was more instrumental and its contribution – more fruitful. By 1997 the 
IMF had gained considerable experience in dealing with transition-specific economic 
problems (largely learning from its own mistakes and from the mistakes of policy makers in 
the countries in transition). After several years of involvement in Bulgaria the IMF also had 
much better understanding of the local context, the institutional environment and the specific 
problems of the Bulgarian economy and was familiar with its political setup. The IMF was 
also frustrated by its series of failures in Bulgaria and was eager to achieve success. In this 
case the IMF also had a much more motivated and cooperative local partner. The UDF was 
keen to demonstrate its competence in reforming the economy. Also for the first time after 
the fall of communism it had full control of power to implement its own reform agenda. 
The joint work on the formulation of the new reform program started already during 
the crisis and accelerated during the term of office of the caretaker government as practically 
there was no doubt that the UDF would win the coming parliamentary elections. By the time 
of the elections (June 1997) the main legislative and other policy documents were ready and 
the newly elected government could launch them from day one. Notably, compared to the 
first reform program of 1991 there were major differences both in terms of the approach 
towards macroeconomic stabilization and with respect to the conceptual framework and 
paradigm of the overall reform effort. In addition, due to the strong commitment of the new 
government to the new reform course, in this case there were no ownership problems in 
implementation. Besides, several years of reform efforts had helped in upgrading Bulgaria’s 
state capacity which facilitated the implementation of reforms. 
The key component and instrument of the policy approach towards macroeconomic 
stabilization was a currency board arrangement (CBA). The establishment of the CBA was de 
facto unilaterally imposed by the IMF as a non-negotiable pre-condition for new funding (it 
was a “take it or leave it” approach).
22 The debates on the CBA rationale during the period 
prior to its establishment were mostly of academic character and could not affect the decision 
making process. Actually, both at the time of its establishment and during the first several 
years of its operation it would have been rather difficult to argue for a CBA based on strictly 
                                                 
22 During the negotiations with the IMF the UDF leader (later Prime Minister) Ivan Kostov actually was against 
the CBA as this arrangement undoubtedly reduced the degrees of his future policy freedom. economic arguments (such as whether it reflected an optimum currency area). The decision 
thus was almost entirely political, aiming to institute a d isciplining mechanism in 
macroeconomic (in particular monetary) policy, a “straitjacket” for irresponsible politicians. 
Under the CBA, which started operation in July, the nominal exchange rate was fixed against 
the Deutsche mark (subsequently to the euro) for an indefinite period of time with unlimited 
convertibility of base money. Under this arrangement there was no room for sovereign 
monetary policy: the central bank was banned from open market operations and refinancing 
of commercial banks. A country applying a CBA de facto “borrows” the monetary policy of 
the country of the reserve currency.
23 
Equally important, the macroeconomic policy mix was supplemented with a major 
change in the design and implementation of fiscal policy. Under the CBA the instruments of 
fiscal policy, in principle, remained available to policy makers; however, in practice, the 
degrees of their fiscal policy freedom are limited by the requirement to target long-term fiscal 
sustainability (Dobrinsky, 2001).
24 At the insistence of the IMF, Bulgaria’s fiscal policy 
under the CBA was to be set up under a so-called medium-term fiscal framework which 
would guarantee fiscal sustainability. Its main role was to institute instruments and 
mechanisms that would allow policy makers to analyze in a consistent framework the longer-
term implication of policy decisions taken an a given point in time and thus set a policy 
course that would ensure macroeconomic stability and continuity in the conduct of fiscal 
policy in the longer run (see Horvath and Székely, 2003). The medium-term fiscal framework 
was a major technical innovation in the whole of eastern Europe and in the course of its 
implementation proved a great success. It was in fact a second policy “straitjacket” related to 
the fiscal component of the macroeconomic policy mix. 
  However, the new reform program was much wider in ambition and scope than a 
macroeconomic stabilization effort. Foremost, it did try to address some of the important roof 
causes of the reform failures during the first phase of transition. Given the pitiful experience 
of the financial crisis and the almost complete loss of confidence in the banking system, one 
of the first priorities was to rehabilitate the banks that survived the crisis. Notably, the key 
emphasis in the reform measures was placed on some institutional aspects.  
Some of the important new measures targeted further tightening of the formal 
prudential banking regulations and the functioning of banking supervision. Thus new 
technical criteria regulating risky exposition of commercial banks as well as tighter capital 
adequacy requirements were put in place and much more stringent requirements on bank 
reporting to the supervision authority. Other measures targeted the system of incentives in the 
banking system with the aim of actually enforcing good banking practices; an important 
innovation in this respect was the introduction of a threat of criminal penalty for the most 
severe abuses of the regulations of prudential lending. Other components of the reform 
programme targeted the discontinuation of the flow of bank credit to the unviable SOEs. For 
this purpose, a group of large loss-making SOEs were placed in “financial isolation” whereby 
they could not have access to normal bank credit but only to targeted budget subsidies which, 
however, were conditioned on performance (and thus targeted restructuring of these 
enterprises).
25 The implementation of the financial isolation program lasted several years; 
some of these firms were indeed restructured while others were liquidated. 
                                                 
23 In the case of Bulgaria, this was initially the Deutsche Bundesbank, and later, the ECB. 
24 Hence fiscal policy, by definition, is deprived of its main macroeconomic policy variable: the possibility of 
maintaining an independently targeted fiscal position. In this sense after 1997 Bulgaria had zero degrees of 
macroeconomic policy freedom.  
25 The financial isolation program was formally started already in 1996; however, vigorous implementation 
began only under the new government.   During the years that followed, a number of important structural and institutional 
reforms (most of which were designed under the IMF, World Bank and EC guidance) were 
also given a start. The Bulgarian authorities implemented a major tax reform including 
important changes in the system of taxation such as the unification of the personal income 
tax, simplification in the system of corporate taxation and reorganization of the tax collection 
system. The main direction of the tax reforms has been towards lowering of the tax burden 
(especially as regards direct taxes
26) compensated by more efficient tax collection. The latter 
partly sought to eliminate the previous financial leaks from the budget towards unviable SOE 
in the form of tax arrears. 
  Major reforms of the pension and health care systems were launched in 1999 (see 
Appendix 1 for details) and other components of the social security system (such as social 
welfare) were also reorganized. All of these reforms targeted the achievement of long-term 
financial self-sufficiency of these systems and thus had important, though not immediate, 
fiscal implications (in the short run direct transfers from the budget continued but in 
diminishing levels). Privatization was finally given a solid start. The government declared 
that sales to strategic foreign investors would have the highest priority in its privatization 
efforts and this period saw several landmark sales of large SOEs. The years between 1997 
and 1999 was the period of most intensive ownership transfer combining commercial 
privatization (table 4) and the subsequent waves of mass privatization (which mostly 
involved small and medium-sized SOEs). Bank privatization was given a high priority and by 
2004 all state-owned banks were privatized to strategic foreign investors.  
The start of accession negotiations with the EU in 1999 was another landmark in 
Bulgaria’s reforms. The process of accession negotiations played an extremely important role 
in the process of market reforms in Bulgaria, especially in their institutional aspect. While the 
post-crisis reforms inspired by the IMF and the World Bank mostly sought to establish 
functioning market institutions, the preparation for EU accession implied a considerable 
widening and deepening of the reform process. It set  the goal, within a relatively short 
historic time span to upgrade these institutions to a status typical of a mature market 
economy. 
This preparation of EU accession involved negotiations under 30 “chapters” which 
comprise the EU’s  acquis communautaire.
27 “ Closing” each of these chapters in the 
negotiation process signifies that the country has harmonized its respective legislative, 
regulatory or institutional environment with those in the EU.
28 This process implied an almost 
complete overhaul of the economic legislation and regulations and major changes in the 
functioning of public institutions in order to make them compatible with those of the EU. The 
accession negotiations were also an important learning process for the government official 
involved in them as they not only had to acquire new knowledge and skills but also had to get 
accustomed to the way they EU homologues operate. 
 
  Change of power without a change in the direction of reforms 
The post-1997 period was marked by growing political maturity and stability. An 
important factor for the success of the reforms undertaken after 1997 was the fact that in the 
main they were supported by the major political parties including the reforming BSP where 
the reformist wing had taken control. Therefore, although there were differences with respect 
                                                 
26 Thus between 1998 and 2004, the average statutory tax rate on corporate profit taxes was lowered from 32.5% 
to 19.5%. 
27 The body of common rights and obligations which bind the Member States together within the EU. The 
chapters cover virtually all aspects of the macro- and microeconomic environment and the related policy areas. 
28 By mid-2004 Bulgaria closed all 30 chapters and the signing of the accession treaty was expected to take 
place in early 2005. to policy priorities and the selected policy issues, since 1997 there has been a general political 
support for the overall direction of reforms. Thus all political parties have time and again 
voiced their support for the CBA as the key underlying instrument for maintaining 
macroeconomic stability. All main political parties supported the orientation towards fast 
accession to the EU and the measures necessary to achieve that goal. When the crucial issue 
on the membership  in NATO was put to vote in parliament, it also received unanimous 
support (although BSP had agonized internally for a long period over its attitude on this 
issue).  
The two main parties gradually took a more stable shape and place in the political 
spectrum.  The UDF was re-organized from a coalition to a single party with a christian-
democratic orientation (although some of the former coalition parties refused to be integrated 
into the new party and left). The BSP was taking the shape of a mainstream left-wing party of 
a social-democratic orientation. The MRF retained its claim on the political centre. The 
overall political constellation that was taking shape seemed to be that of a typical political 
system in a modern democracy. Having a comfortable parliamentary majority, the UDF 
government managed to successfully complete its term in office in 2001 (the first government 
after 1989 to do so) and was hoping for a renewal of its mandate. 
  However, in 2001 something extraordinarily unusual and unexpected occurred on the 
Bulgarian political scene. The former Bulgarian monarch Simeon II – son of the pre-World 
War II king and heir to the throne (the monarchy was formally abolished in 1946) – returned 
to Bulgaria and claimed his ambition for an active role in Bulgarian political life. Initially he 
sought nomination for the upcoming presidential elections but this ambition was denied by 
UDF who were not willing to share their absolute control of power.
29 But then Simeon 
decided to realize his political ambitions through direct participation in the political life and 
in the parliamentary elections. Astonishingly for most observers, the newly formed National 
Movement of Simeon II (NMSII), which only came into existence in April 2001, won a 
landslide victory at the June parliamentary elections and this brought about a major 
reshuffling of the Bulgarian political scene.  
  The former monarch enjoyed wide personal popular support from various and quite 
heterogeneous segments of the population ranging from selected parts of the business elite 
(which is not numerous but apparently highly influential within the movement) to the 
dominating in numbers group of those who were dissatisfied – maybe for different reasons –
with the outcomes of the reforms.  The latter was in fact the core of the so called “silent 
majority”: those that abstained from vote in previous elections and who probably would not 
have voted in 2001 in the absence of the new alternative (this group had been steadily 
growing during the previous several years).  This time the silent majority likely provided the 
decisive electoral support for the former king’s political movement.  In fact, the level of 
electoral activity in these parliamentary elections (some 67% of those eligible to vote) was 
among the highest during the past decade. But in addition, thanks to his personal popularity, 
Simeon II attracted a large portion of the non-core electorate of both BSP’s and UDF’s, who 
were disappointed by the traditional parties. Notably the waning of support for UDF was due 
to the fact that despite the obvious progress in the reforms, it failed to address some important 
issues such as corruption (see below). 
The economic program of  NMSII was highly eclectic, combining liberal ideas 
(reflecting the visions of a group of young financiers that designed the program and 
subsequently took key positions in government) and populist pledges (probably coming from 
the political entourage close to the former monarch). These parts of the program apparently 
                                                 
29 Formally Simeon was blocked from p articipating in the presidential elections through a constitutional 
procedure. sought to appease the most numerous political constituency of the movement. In fact the 
program combined seemingly inconsistent and conflicting objectives: on the one hand, it 
asserted the goals to limit considerably state intervention in the economy, reduce public 
administration and public spending, and accelerate privatization; on the other, it pledged to 
reduce the level of taxation, increase public support to the weakest layers of society, expand 
the existing social programs, strengthen the police, create new public institutions.  Besides, it 
envisaged meeting all these targets under the assumption of a zero budget deficit and the 
preservation of the currency board arrangement. NMSII pledged to strengthen the judiciary 
and fight corruption as well as to eliminate the remaining bureaucratic h urdles for doing 
business. Most controversially, Simeon committed himself to the target of achieving a 
“perceptible improvement in the living standards of the population within 800 days”. 
  However, after  NMSII took office, most of the populist pledges were  de facto 
dropped and the government has followed a center-right type of economic policy. In fact, 
there was a remarkable degree of continuity in the policy course after the 2001 government 
changeover. The existing macroeconomic policy framework was kept intact and Simeon’s 
government continued to stick to a prudential fiscal stance based on the medium-term fiscal 
framework. The NMSII carried on and developed further all institutional reforms initiated by 
its predecessor. There was full continuity in the accession negotiations with the EU. Thus the 
general direction of the reform process was preserved despite the change of government. In 
this, the changeover of power in 2001 was also very different from those before 1997 when 
every new government tended to reverse the policy course of its predecessor. 
  In this sense it could be argued that after 1997 the key political forces in the country 
de facto – albeit tacitly – agreed upon a policy and reform course that resembled the “Golden 
Straitjacket” described by Friedman’s (1999) whereby their differences amounted to slight 
differences and nuances in the policy course. Friedman used this metaphor to define the 
policy course to which a government needs to abide if it strived for efficient integration into 
the world economy. This interpretation fits almost perfectly to the situation in Bulgaria: the 
tacit agreement among the Bulgarian political forces largely reflects their joint support to the 
course towards EU membership. 
 
Improving macroeconomic fundamentals 
In the period after 1997 Bulgaria’s macroeconomic performance improved 
considerably, especially when compared to the preceding period (see table 1 for a comparison 
of the two periods of Bulgaria’s reforms). However, not everything changed to the better at 
once. The first notable success was the fast macroeconomic stabilization underpinned by the 
combination of a CBA and prudent fiscal policy: already by 1998 inflation was under control 
and thereafter there have never been fears of a return to a path of high inflation (table 3). 
Quite remarkably, the macroeconomic policy framework established in 1997 and its main 
instruments have never been questioned either by the governments in office or by any of the 
opposition parties. This national consensus on the macroeconomic policy course has been a 
key factor for the successful macroeconomic stabilization in the years that followed.  
Furthermore, there emerged a virtuous circle in macroeconomic stabilization related 
to the preparation for EU accession which contributed to a more harmonious operation of 
Bulgaria’s macroeconomic policy framework. On the one hand, the policy mix based on the 
CBA allowed the economy to embark on a fast track towards nominal convergence with the 
EU prior to accession (as required by the Maastricht criteria). In turn, the wide-ranging 
measures of policy harmonization and the rapidly increasing trade with the EU contributed to 
an increasing degree of synchronization of Bulgaria’s business cycle with that in the EU. 
Hence one could argue that the operation of the CBA contributed to the materialization of its own economic rationale (in particular, the optimum currency zone conditions, an issue that 
was largely ignored at the time of the establishment of the CBA). 
After 1998 there has been a sustained recovery in gross output and a marked upturn in 
fixed investment (reflecting rising investor confidence), reversing the trend of previous years. 
The economic upturn was at first mostly driven by the recovery in services while the 
manufacturing industry was adversely by the ongoing restructuring of loss-making SOEs: the 
recession in the manufacturing industry continued until 1999 (table 3). However, thanks to 
the acceleration of new investment in the manufacturing industry (including a rapid upturn in 
FDI), manufacturing output also started to recover after 2000. The sustained economic upturn 
contributed to a rapid recovery in real incomes. 
As a result of the comprehensive financial reforms, financial stability was also 
gradually restored. While the establishment of the currency board arrangement contributed 
greatly to macroeconomic stabilization, the latter would not have been possible without deep 
and institutional and structural reforms that targeted the core source of financial instability, 
the quasi-fiscal deficit. The new draconian prudential regulations (including the treat of 
criminal pursuit) introduced in 1997 forced bankers to be extremely cautious in lending;
30 as 
a result the flow of new bad loans actually disappeared. The financial isolation program was 
also quite instrumental in this regard. At the same time, these stringent measures helped the 
banks to restore their financial health and with that public confidence in the banking system 
also gradually started to return. The fact that most large state-owned banks were privatized to 
respected international financial institutions also played an important role for the return of 
public confidence in the banking system.  
In the course of time, financial intermediation started to revive and since 2001 there 
has been a surge in credit activity (table 3). In stark contrast to the situation prior to 1997, the 
new credit boom has not been accompanied by a deterioration in the quality of the banks’ 
portfolios. The economy started to remonetize but the devastating effects of the financial 
crisis have not been overcome yet: in proportion to GDP, most monetary aggregates 
(deposits, commercial credit, broad money) in 2003 were still below their pre-crisis level. 
Major improvements materialized in the fiscal system a nd this brought about a 
remarkable consolidation in public finances. The cyclical upturn boosted the tax base and 
contributed to higher budget revenue. But more importantly, the institutional changes in the 
tax system helped to improve considerably the efficiency of tax collection and gave further 
boost to public revenue collection.
31 Over the whole period after 1997 actual fiscal revenue at 
the end of the year systematically exceeded the budgetary projections and this has allowed 
the governments some additional flexibility in spending without jeopardizing the fiscal 
stance. The fall in interest rates contributed to a drastic reduction in interest expenditure after 
1998; which also allowed the government to reduce the primary surplus to less burdensome 
levels (figures 3 and 4) and to increase considerably real non-interest spending. The sharp fall 
of public debt as a proportion of GDP occurred as a result of the combined effect of several 
factors: the erosion of the real value of debt denominated in domestic currency; the partial 
restructuring of the debt and the continuing real appreciation of the currency (figure 5) which 
reduced the level of the external debt as a proportion of GDP.  
The fast reform progress in these years is also evidenced by the regular assessments 
performed by EBRD which assesses annually the progress in transition in 27 east European 
and CIS countries that undergo transition from plan to market on a scale of comparable 
                                                 
30 The sharp disruption in the flow of credit to the corporate sector (de facto a credit crunch) was another factor 
that affected adversely manufacturing activity in this period. 
31 One of the interesting innovations of the NMSII government was the hiring of a foreign consulting firm to 
supervise the operations of the customs offices which were notorious for their corrupt practices. By all accounts, 
this has been a successful experiment which resulted in a sharp increase in customs duties. measure (table 6). In these assessments Bulgaria moved from being one of the laggards in 
reforms before 1997, to one of the more advanced reformers in the period thereafter. Another 
sign of positive change has been the surge in the flow of inward FDI after 1997, in contrast to 
the anaemic inflows prior to that (table 3). Foreign investors “vote with their feet” and this 
change is a clear indication of the improvement in the investment climate and the business 
environment in general. FDI contributed to the reconstruction effort in the country and the 
upgrading of its fixed assets. 
 
Unresolved issues 
However, the reform outcomes have not been uniformly positive and a number of 
unresolved issues still remain. Thus in the immediate aftermath of the policy regime change 
there were also some negative macroeconomic side effects. The acceleration of enterprise 
restructuring (and the closure of a number of loss-making SOEs triggered a surge in 
unemployment which remained very high until 2003 (table 3). It took several years of strong 
recovery and the introduction of some active labor market policy measures in 2002 (including 
a public works program) for the labor market to start recovering. Notwithstanding, the labor 
market continues to be marred by structural problems such as skill mismatch: the majority of 
large pool of long-term unemployed do not have the necessary knowledge and skills 
demanded by the expanding firms. 
On the institutional front not everything went smoothly either. An important policy 
lapse of the UDF government was its failure (indeed reluctance) to address the problems of 
corruption. This had serious negative implications both for the outcomes of some reforms and 
for the government itself. At the time of the changeover of power in 1997 the prevalent 
expectation was that the new government would undertake radical steps to eradicate the 
endemic corruption. However, despite its publicly declared intentions in this area, the UDF 
did not launch concrete policy measures to break the institutional setup that bred corrupt 
practices. In fact, in 1998 when its public support was at its peak, the UDF cabinet missed a 
window of opportunity for constitutional amendments and radical administrative reforms. 
What is more, in some of its practices the new government actually was perceived as 
even more corrupt than its predecessors. The most conspicuous examples are related to 
privatization. During the UDF rule the abuse of the dysfunctional institutional arrangements 
in the area of commercial privatization likely reached its peak. In this period commercial 
privatization developed into an utterly clientelist system (in the sense of Ruis and Walle, 
2003), in which the ruling elite sought to provide unjustified private benefits to its key 
political friends.
32 But also in other areas of public regulation (such as public procurement, 
business permits, etc.) the government openly favored its cronies. In addition, the governing 
party de facto also reproduced the clientelistic pattern of recruitment of civil servants and 
party activists in the public administration.
33  
These practices provoked a highly negative public reaction and, despite the notable 
success in other aspects of the reform process, this gradually eroded public support for the 
UDF government. As suggested by some recent analytical studies, the failure in the fight 
against corruption was on of the most serious causes for the UDF’s election loss in 2001. For 
                                                 
32 In fact, this was likely a deliberate policy of at least one part of the UDF leadership. Thus one of the UDF 
leader reportedly openly stated that providing private benefits to its supporters through the process of 
privatization was a way to thank them for their political support in bringing the party to power. 
33 Despite the widespread corruption, clientelism did not reach the scope of state capture during the UDF term in 
office either. One additional factor that prevented this from happening in this period was the counterbalancing 
effect of the EU accession negotiations. The need to approximate Bulgarian legislative and regulatory norms to 
those in the EU not only played a strong anchoring role in the legislative process but also to a large extent 
filtered out the distortive effect of various pressure groups. example, in his analysis of the 2001 elections, Valev (2003) argues that the high and rising 
unemployment in the post-1997 period is not sufficient to explain the loss of political support 
by the ruling “reformist” party. In the event, the reformists were voted out but reforms were 
not reversed (and this is what happened in other transition economies as well). The author 
goes on to argue that internal resistance to reforms had weakened considerably post-1997; in 
this period reforms were already largely perceived as irreversible. In such circumstances, the 
solution requires further reforms rather than their stalling as a policy reversal would only lead 
to a deterioration of economic situation.
34 By contrast, he argues that among the reasons for 
the election loss were the inefficiency of the government in fighting corruption and crime, the 
lack of transparency in privatization, the “communication failures” of the ruling political 
force in selling its policies to the public as well as were some unpopular moves undertaken by 
the government. Thus overall the 2001 vote was not at all a vote against the reforms; quite the 
opposite, it was a vote against the failure of the ruling party to make progress in one 
important area of the needed reform effort. 
The fight against corruption was one of the key catchphrases in the program of the 
NMSII government and some progress in this area has been made by this government. In 
particular, the new amendments to the Law on privatization put an end to the privatization 
techniques that incited corrupt practices. Also, the new government undertook concrete steps 
towards increasing the transparency in the working of the public administration. However, 
notably corrupt practices are still perceived to be widespread and are far from being 
eradicated. 
None of the post-1997 governments has invested sufficient efforts in reforming the 
judiciary system and its inefficiency has remained as an important institutional weakness. 
The negative implications of this failure (such as the high crime rate, the weakness in contract 
enforcement, etc.) are still al too visible in the Bulgarian institutional landscape. Some of the 
factors of these disappointing outcomes are related to implementation problems (new 
regulations targeting change in performance have been adopted but their implementation is 
poor due to internal resistance in the judiciary system and pressures likely originating in 
groups of organized crime) or to problems in the legislative problem (e.g. it is claimed that a 
more comprehensive reform in the judiciary system would require a change in the 
Constitution but that calls for a qualified majority in parliament which is difficult to reach). 
Progress in the reform of the judiciary system will remain an important challenge for 




  The process of economic and political transformation in Bulgaria after 1989 has been 
featured by a series of failures in its initial phases and relatively successful reforms in later 
stages. As evidenced throughout this paper, the factors that contributed to the uneven course 
of market reforms in the country, were are complex and interrelated. The analysis of the main 
driving forces of the reform process in the country  – including the factors that served as 
impediments or catalysts to the reform process – is the main research objective in the paper. 
By developing an analytic narrative which integrates a multidisciplinary approach we have 
tried to highlight the interrelations between various aspects of the reform process and their 
outcomes. In addition, by formulating and testing a number of hypothesis we have sought to 
shed further light on some of the important driving forces of the reform process. 
                                                 
34 In the sense of Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), this can be interpreted as the difference between ex ante and ex 
post opposition to reforms: ex ante hostility to the reforms is not necessarily inconsistent with ex post support, 
as the opposition from losers weakens once reforms have been given a credible start.   We find convincing evidence that the specificities of the context played important, if 
not dominating, role in the initial phases of Bulgaria’s reforms. A multiplicity of contextual 
factors  – such as the difficult initial economic conditions, specific cultural and historic 
legacies, unfavourable geography, low state capacity, etc. – entailed path dependence and de 
facto acted as strong deterrents to the market reforms. These difficulties were compounded by 
the disintegration of some important public institutions after the collapse of the communist 
regime (which triggered an institutional hiatus) and other flaws in the institutional 
environment, which in general not conducive for market reforms. Given the inadequate 
formal institutions and the specific cultural and historic legacies, micro incentives for reform 
were rather weak and often perverse, giving rise to adverse side effects such as financial 
indiscipline, rent seeking, corruption.  
  External factors also affected the dynamics of Bulgarian reforms. Being a small 
peripheral country at the European outskirt, external factors had always played an important 
coordination function in the shaping of domestic policies. In this sense, the fall of 
communism (when Russia “deserted” this function) opened a coordination vacuum in 
Bulgaria’s politics and policy. For various reasons, as discussed in the text, the EU was slow 
to show interest in Bulgaria’s reforms and the only important external actor in this period was 
the IMF. However, the first IMF-supported programs did not address adequately the 
transition-specific economic problems in the country. In terms of their underlying paradigm 
(which was dominated by the spirit of the “Washington Consensus”) they put too much 
emphasis on macroeconomics and too little on the context and the institutional environment. 
Besides, due to communication problems and weak state capacity, these policies did not 
enjoy sufficient support from the government bureaucracy and were largely mistrusted by the 
wide public. Due to their design flaws and the “ownership vacuum”, the fund-supported 
reform programs undertaken in the initial phase of transition largely missed their targets and 
goals. 
The political economy of the reform effort in the initial phase of transition was also 
very difficult. Because of the legacies of the past, Bulgaria was facing the combination of a 
complex reform agenda and a very painful adjustment effort, which would have been a major 
challenge for any government. Political support of the needed reforms was weak, or even 
absent, due to high uncertainty about the possible gains, and this became a political obstacle 
to their implementation. Different interest groups feared, and were unwilling to accept, a 
disproportionate share of the costs of reforms. The political i ncentives for reforms were 
further abated by the short average lifetime of governments which reduced their policy 
horizons.
35 The political system was highly polarised and ideologically biased, centered 
around the two main political centres: BSP and UDF. Under these conditions, many 
important market reforms were put on hold. In fact, as shown in the paper, such an outcome 
is consistent with the results of some models of policy reform based on rational choice: under 
similar assumptions, a number of rational choice policy reform models predict a political 
stalemate and delay of reforms.  
One of the main reform failures in this phase was the inability of the society to 
establish a core agreement on a coherent reform program addressing both the adjustment 
effort  and the core market reform agenda. The needed adjustment effort was hardly 
marketable to an electoral constituency as it involved highly painful and unpopular measures; 
besides, the society was divided as to the general direction of market reform process. In the 
technical sense this was equivalent to a coordination failure among stakeholders and 
politicians. Stakeholder groups were unstable and changed in shape and structure during the 
                                                 
35 Thus, if policy makers maximize a utility function which depends on the outcomes within the duration of the 
actual term in office, then policies that would eventually yield benefits only in the long-term horizon but would 
obviously incur high costs in the short-run, have little chances to enter the policy agenda. course of reforms. Political polarization pushed the reform agenda in different directions. The 
absence of a strong external anchor – one that could implement the coordination function – 
also contributed to this coordination failure. The general outcome was a stop-and-go reform 
course, with frequent change in policy direction  and revisions in previously adopted 
measures.  
As argued in the paper, it is the multitude of these intertwined factors and 
developments that undermined Bulgaria’s first reform efforts. In a complex and wide-ranging 
reform effort, all its aspects (from context, to institutions, to design, to political constraints, to 
implementation) have their role. Bulgaria’s experience confirms that disregarding or that 
underestimating the importance of any of these components alone can drive a reform effort to 
a failure. The country’s experience in this period also helps to understand better why policies 
that worked in other transition economies turned out to be unsuccessful (or non-starters) in 
Bulgaria: a different context and/or country-specific structural and institutional characteristics 
led to completely different country outcomes of a reform program of the same or similar 
design. 
One of the intriguing twists in Bulgaria’s transition has been the radical turnaround in 
policy and economic performance after the 1996-1997 crisis. We provide evidence in the 
paper that this major change in the course of reforms (which  ex post turned out to be 
successful) was triggered by two concurrent developments: 1) the window of opportunity 
opened by the crisis itself and 2) the change in the external environment, at first the more 
efficient assistance by the IMF and later, the supportive role of the EU. At the same time, the 
second reform effort could be sustained and developed further thanks to important changes in 
the context and institutional environment which made them more conducive to market 
reforms. Some of these changes were gradual but in the course of time the supportive 
contextual and institutional aspects gradually started to outnumber and outweigh those 
features that hampered the reform process. 
We show in the paper that the background and the framework of the successful 
reforms in Bulgaria were no less complex than those of the previous failed reform efforts, 
involving multifaceted interactions of various stakeholders and actors. The motivation of the 
second reform effort, as well as its initial agenda, were largely determined by the effect of 
Bulgaria’s deep transition crisis. We show that – consistent with the results of policy reform 
models based on rational choice  – the  crisis did indeed stage the conditions for the 
implementation of delayed necessary but painful reforms. Thus in the case of Bulgaria it was 
only when inflation was threatening to get out of control completely, that a political solution 
on the stabilization course was agreed upon among the political forces. Moreover, in the 
course of time, the tacit political agreement on one key reform area (stabilization) gradually 
expanded to other important aspects of the reform agenda. It fact it reflected an emerging 
broad agreement among major stakeholders on the general direction of the reform process. 
The core of the 1997 reform program was a complete overhaul of the macroeconomic 
order: the combination of a currency board and balanced fiscal policy were intended to do 
away with the irresponsible policy practices of the past. The actual launching of the reforms 
was designed to signal a complete regime change: the start of operation of the currency board 
coincided with the start of the new government’s term in office. However, what made the 
stabilization effort sustainable was the fact that policy addressed from the very start some 
transition-related specificities of the context and the institutional environment that bred 
financial instability such as improper regulatory norms, malfunctioning of important public 
institutions, distorted incentives in banks and firms. Through the successful implementation 
of corrective measures targeting these problematic areas it became possible to arrest the 
quasi-fiscal deficit, the main source of financial and macroeconomic instability. Fast success in macroeconomic stabilization allowed the government to refocus its 
main attention towards important institutional and systemic reforms such as privatization, 
public finance, pension system, health care. Success in financial and macroeconomic 
stabilization and a notable improvement in macroeconomic performance contributed to a 
growing credibility of the government reform effort and in this sense the sequencing of 
reforms was another ingredient of their overall success. In turn, fast progress in these areas of 
reform allowed Bulgaria to make up to a great extent for the significant delays incurred in the 
first phase of transition. 
The role of external stakeholders  – in particular, the IMF and  the EU  – for the 
turnaround in the course of Bulgarian reforms cannot be overstated. The IMF was the first to 
give impetus to the new reform effort. The Fund itself had learned from its own past 
mistakes, as well as from the experience of other countries, and by 1997 had introduced 
important changes in its approach to market reforms in economies in transition from plan to 
market. This new approach (in fact applied in Bulgaria after 1997) put much greater emphasis 
on the context and institutional environment. Both the political will of the reformist 
government and better communication with the IMF helped to resolve the problem of 
“ownership” regarding the new reform program. 
At the same time, the role of the EU was increasing and gradually it became the 
dominant external anchor of the reform process through the mechanisms of accession 
negotiations. The preparation for accession to the EU in fact defined a broad reform agenda 
with clearly defined goals and means. The prospects of membership in this prestigious club 
of developed nations also established strong and clear incentives to the politicians involved in 
this process. Bulgaria’s experience confirms what had also surfaced in the experience of the 
more advanced central European countries, namely that the realistic prospect of EU 
membership was the single most important driver and catalyst of the reform process in these 
countries, providing a powerful impetus for the acceleration of their market reforms. With the 
reorientation to a new dominant external power (from Russia to the EU and NATO), the 
process of “switching” of this peripheral area of the European continent (a changeover that 
had started with the fall of communism) was complete. 
Bulgaria’s experience is also insightful as regards the relations between reform 
agenda and reform outcomes and in particular, about the importance of the feedback from 
outcomes to the formulation of the reform agenda. In a number of episodes, this experience 
suggests endogeneity of the ongoing policy process and its political constraints/degrees of 
freedom. In other words, subsequent policy decisions on the course of reform very much 
depend on previous policy and its outcomes as well as on the changing attitude of the 
populace. The endogeneity of the policy process is partly responsible for the emergence of 
circles (both vicious and virtuous) which affected the speed of Bulgarian reforms (acting as 
deterrents or catalysts, respectively) and their outcomes (amplifying their negative, 
respectively, positive results). Thus in the initial phase of transition the dismal outcomes of 
partial reforms served to put breaks on the reform process. By contrast, the success in the first 
reforms initiated after 1997 boosted the government’s credibility and contributed to the 
acceleration of the reform process. These outcomes emphasize the importance of a careful 
monitoring of the outcomes of the ongoing reforms and even of preventive corrections in case 
of major deviations between goals and expectations and actual outcomes. 
Overall, as evidenced in this paper, Bulgaria’s experience in economic and political 
transformation is one of failure and success. This rich and sometimes painful experience can 
provide important lessons to policy makers in other countries that face the need to introduce 
far  reaching fundamental economic reforms. One of the more general lessons  – equally 
relevant for success or failure  – concerns the complexity of the reform process: market reforms are a multifaceted and multidimensional process and those who initiate in cannot 
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Milestones of Bulgaria’s Reforms: 1990-2004 
 
1. Reform of the political system 
 
•  Removal of Communist leader Todor Zhivkov from power (November 1989). 
•  Roundtable with the participation of the incumbent ruling Communist party and the 
emerging new political forces (1990). Outcome: decision to hold elections for a Grand 
National Assembly. 
•  Adoption of a new Constitution (1991). Establishing a pluralistic democracy and a 
market economy based on private property; separation of the legislative, executive 
and judicial systems. 
•  Establishment of a Constitutional Court and independent judiciary (1992). 
 
2. General elections, presidential elections and governments in office 
 
•  Election for a Grand National Assembly (1990): BSP 47%; UDF 36%. BSP 
government, A. Lukanov (1990); Broad coalition government (1990-1991): D Popov. 
•  Presidential elections (1991): Zhelyu Zhelev (UDF) 
•  General election (1991): UDF 34%; BSP 33%;. UDF Government, F.Dimitrov (1991-
1992); “Expert” government, D.Berov (1992-1994).  
•  General elections (1994): BSP 44%; UDF 24%. BSP government, Zh. Videnov 
(1995-1996); Caretaker government, S. Sofianski (1997). 
•  Presidential elections (1996): Petar Stoyanov (UDF) 
•  Early general elections (1997): UDF 49%; BSP 22%. UDF Government, I.Kostov 
(1997-2001).  
•  General elections (2001): NMSII 43%; UDF 18%; BSP 17%. NMSII government, S. 
Saxe Coburg-Gotha (2001-…). 
•  Presidential elections (2001): Georgi Parvanov (BSP) 
 
3. Ownership transformation 
 
•  Commercial Law (company code) (1991). Set the rules of establishing new companies 
allowing the market entry of de novo private firms. 
•  Law on Foreign Investment (1991) allowing the market entry of foreign firms. 
•  Restitution laws (1991, 1992, 1997 and 1998). Regulate the restitution of various 
types of property (real estate, agricultural land, industrial property) confiscated during 
communism to their previous owners or their heirs. 
•  Law on privatization (1991-1992, subsequently revised more than 30 times). 
Regulates the change of ownership in SOEs 
•  Establishment of a Privatization Agency (1991). 
•  Establishment of the National Land Council (1992), dealing with land restitution. 
•  Establishment of Foreign Investment Agency (1995) with the mission to encourage 
assist foreign direct investment. 
•  Law on mass privatization (1995). Established a procedure of privatizing SOEs 
through a voucher scheme. 
•  Mass privatization: two waves (1996 and 1999) covering some 1600 SOEs. 
•  Establishment of privatization (investment) funds (1995-1996). •  Establishment of an Agency for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (1997) with the 
goal to promote the development of de novo private firms. 
•  Privatization of state-owned banks: all such banks were privatized between 1999 and 
2003. 
•  Privatization in telecommunications and other utilities (2003-…). 
 
4. Reforms of the financial system 
 
•  Law on the Bulgarian National Bank (1991). Established a two-tier banking system 
based an independent central bank.  
•  Law on Banks and Credit Activity (1992). Regulation of the activity of commercial 
banks. 
•  Establishment of the Bank Consolidation Company (1992) with the mission to 
privatize state-owned banks. 
•  Counterproductive financial bailouts of unviable SOEs and state-owned commercial 
banks (1991-1996). 
•  Financial Isolation Program (1996-1999). Restructuring and rehabilitation (or 
liquidation) of large SOEs 
•  Rehabilitation of the banking system (1996-1997). Liquidation of 15 bankrupt banks. 
•  Amendments to the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank (1997). Establishment of a 
currency board. 
•  Amendments to the Law on Banks and Credit Activity (1997). Significant tightening 
of prudential banking regulations. 
•  Establishment of the Bulgarian Stock Exchange in Sofia (1997). 
 
5. Trade liberalization 
 
•  Removal of the state monopoly over foreign trade (1990) 
•  Gradual lifting of non-tariff barriers to trade and reform of the tariff system (main 
steps undertaken in 1991 and 1992) 
•  Free trade agreement with the EU (as part of the association agreement) (1993) 
•  Free trade agreement with EFTA (1993) 
•  Accession to WTO (1996) 
•  Accession to the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) (1999) 
 
6. European integration 
 
•  EU Association Agreement/Europe Agreement (1993) 
•  Decision to start EU accession negotiations (1999) 
•  Start of accession negotiations (2000) (27 out of 30 negotiation “chapters” closed by 
mid-2004; negotiations expected to be over by end-2004) 
•  Expected accession to the EU (2007) 
 
7. Major institutional reforms (increasingly related to EU accession) 
 
•  Labor market reforms: New Labor code (1992); Social Protection Programs (1991-…; 
numerous amendments). 
•  Tax reforms: VAT introduction (1993); reform in corporate and personal income 
taxation (1993); •  Separation of the Social Security Fund from the central government budget (1995) 
•  Protection of competition: first Law on the Protection of Competition (1991): limited 
scope; second Law on the Protection of Competition (1998): norms similar to those of 
the EU; Establishment of a Commission for the Protection of Competition (1999). 
•  Reform of public finances: reforms in revenue administration and in expenditure 
management (1999-2003). 
•  Pension Reform based on the establishment of a three-pillar pension system (started in 
1999 with the establishment of the National Insurance Institute); establishment of 
private pension funds (2000-…) 
•  Health Care Reform (started in 1999 with the establishment of the Health Insurance 
Fund) with the goal of establishing a financially self-reliant health care system.  
•  Reform in Public Administration (1998-…): reorganization of the public 





The Institutional Framework of Privatization in Bulgaria 
 
  The process of privatization – in the sense of ownership transfer relating to existing 
SOEs (we do not deal with the privatization of agricultural land, housing and other more 
specific assets) was undertaken in the context of a rather complex (often confusing for 
foreign investors) organizational scheme. In particular, there were numerous public bodies 
and institutions that were empowered to implement privatization deals. 
  A clear division must be made between the two main strands in Bulgarian 
privatization: the so called “commercial” privatization where the ownership transfer took the 
form of a sale and the mass privatization in which selected groups of SOEs were auctioned to 
the population against freely distributed privatization vouchers.  
  Historically it was commercial privatization that started first. The major public body 
entrusted with a privatization mandate is the specially established in 1992 Privatization 
Agency (which is still in existence). Its main function is to organize and implement the sale 
of large and medium-sized SOEs (categorized in the Privatization Law by the book value of 
their total assets). The Agency itself has a rather complex managerial structure: apart from its 
operational office that was in charge of arranging the deals, there is a Supervisory Council 
(whose members are nominated by the Parliament) which  is mandated to oversee the 
operation of the Agency and would give the final approval of the largest deals. The declared 
purpose of this dual structure was to ensure greater transparency in the workings of the 
Privatization Agency and reduce the scope of corruption. However, in practice transparency 
was never featured prominently in the operation of the Privatization Agency, especially in 
this initial period (e.g. none of its sub-bodies made public the motivation of the decisions 
taken), and the public tended to be rather suspicious of the incidence of corrupt practices.  
  Apart from the Agency, numerous other public bodies were assigned with the task of 
selling small SOEs. In fact, it was decide to apply a sectoral approach and each line ministry 
was authorized to sell the small state-owned firms that operated within its functional domain 
(e.g. industry, trade, tourism, construction, transport, communication, etc.). All in all, during 
different sub-periods, more that 10 line ministries were involved in the privatization of small 
SOEs). By 2004 most of the small SOEs have been privatized or liquidated. In addition to 
that, given the historical legacies, a number of SOEs were directly reporting to their 
respective municipal councils (especially in retail trade, repair shops and other communal 
services such as public transportation). In turn, all municipal councils were authorized with the privatization of all SOEs under their control regardless of size. While in mast cases these 
were mostly small firms, in the capital Sofia and other big cities, the amount of assets 
privatized by the municipal councils was quite substantial.  
In both these areas of privatization, the Law stipulates the use of the same techniques 
as those applied by the Privatization agency. Notably, transparency was even a greater 
problem in the case of small and municipal privatization (in the latter case, actually the 
problem still exists). 
The process of mass privatization was implemented by another specially established 
body, the Agency of Mass Privatization. Its main function was to organize a series of public 
auctions during which big groups of SOEs (selected by the Parliament) were offered for 
public sale. The main difference from the commercial privatization was that the only legal 
tender accepted in these auctions were the privatization vouchers, freely distributed to all 
adult citizens. Apart from direct participation, people could also participate in the auction by 
investing their vouchers in the newly established privatization funds. All in all three main 
waves of mass privatization were organized between 1995 and 1999, and covered around 
three thousand SOEs. By 2000 this process was over and the Agency of Mass Privatization 
wound down its activity. Overall, the process of mass privatization was quite transparent and 
there has not been widespread perception of corruption. 
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Real GDP growth, average annual rate, %  -5.1  4.1
Real GDP per capita growth, average annual rate, %  -3.9  5.2
Real investment growth, average annual rate, %  -11.0  19.1
Growth of total employment, average annual rate, %  -3.8  -0.3
Growth of industrial labor productivity, average annual rate, %  -1.0  4.5
Consumer prices inflation, average annual rate, %  233.1  7.9
Growth of average real wages, average annual rate, %  -11.4  6.1
Average share of food expenditure in household budget expenditure, %   47
1/  42
2/
BNB basic interest rate, %  99.6  4.2
Average short-term commercial lending interest, %  130.4  11.8
Commercial rate on (one-month) time deposits, %  71.8  3.1
Consolidated government balance (-deficit), % of GDP (period average)  -6.3  -0.4
Total public debt, % of GDP (period average)  139.8  70.4
FDI annual flow, % of GDP (period average)  1.3  5.6
Share of private sector in GDP, % (period average)  46
1/  69
IMF funding agreements brought to a successful end (number)  0 (out of 4)  3 (out of 3)









Table 2. Bulgaria’s funding agreements with the IMF, 1991-2004 
 
Facility 











Funding agreements with subsequent disbursements subject to IMF conditionality 
Standby Arrangement     Mar 15, 1991    Mar 14, 1992  279.0  no 
Standby Arrangement     Apr 17, 1992    Apr 16, 1993  155.0  no 
Standby Arrangement     Apr 11, 1994    Mar 31, 1995  139.5  no 
Standby Arrangement     Jul 19, 1996    Apr 11, 1997  400.0  no 
Standby Arrangement     Apr 11, 1997    Jun 10, 1998  371.9  yes 
Extended Fund Facility     Sep 25, 1998    Sep 24, 2001  627.6  yes 
Standby Arrangement     Feb 27, 2002    Mar 15, 2004  240.0  yes 
Precautionary Agreement     Aug 6, 2004     Sept. 2006  100.0   
Other funding agreements 
Contingency and Compensatory 
Facility   Feb 25, 1991    60.6   
Systemic Transformation Facility  Apr 14, 1994    116.2   
Contingency and Compensatory 
Facility 
Apr 11, 1997    107.6   
 
Source: IMF (2004); Minassian, 2001.   50
Table 3. Bulgaria: selected macroeconomic indicators, 1990-2003 
  1990  1991 1992  1993 1994  1995  1996 1997  1998  1999 2000  2001  2002 2003 
Population and GDP                   
Total population, end-year level, ths. pers.  8669  8595 8485  8460 8427  8385  8341 8283  8230  8191 8149  7891  7845 7800 
Real GDP (1989=100)  90.9  80.3 74.4  73.3 74.6  76.7  69.5 65.6  68.3  69.8 73.6  76.6  80.3 83.8 
Real GDP/capita (1989=100)  91.7  81.7 76.7  75.8 77.4  80.1  72.9 69.3  72.6  74.6 79.0  85.0  89.6 94.0 
GDP/capita (USD at current exchange rate)  1163  945 1015  1278 1150  1564  1190 1251  1548  1582 1546  1723  1984 2546 
GDP/capita (USD at current PPPs)  5170  4740 4660  4800 5020  5380  5020 5920  6270  6540 7090  7680  8330 9039 
Real economy  (average annual rates of 
change, %, unless otherwise noted) 
                 
Gross domestic product  -9.1  -11.7 -7.3  -1.5 1.8  2.9  -9.4 -5.6  4.0  2.3 5.4  4.1  4.8 4.3 
Gross fixed capital formation  -18.5  -19.9 -7.3  -17.5 1.1  16.1  -21.2 -20.9  35.2  20.8 15.4  19.9  9.3 13.8 
Gross industrial output   -16.8  -22.2 -18.4  -9.8 10.6  4.5  5.1 -18.4  -8.5  -8.0 8.3  1.6  6.5 8.3 
Total employment   -6.1  -13.0 -8.1  -1.6 0.6  1.3  0.1 -3.9  -0.2  -2.6 -3.0  -0.4  0.8 3.5 
Rate of unemployment 1/  1.7  11.1 15.2  16.4 12.8  11.1  12.5 13.7  12.2  16.0 17.9  17.3  16.3 13.5 
Employment in industry  -9.0  -17.9 -13.2  -8.3 -3.7  -2.2  -1.9 -3.6  -3.9  -9.3 -5.7  -1.4  0.1 2.8 
Labor productivity in industry  -8.5  -5.2 -3.1  -2.8 12.6  7.4  7.1 -15.3  -4.1  1.4 14.7  3.0  0.5 11.2 
Prices  and wages (average annual rates of 
change, %)  
                 
Consumer prices  23.8  338.5 91.2  72.8 96.0  62.1  121.6 1058  18.7  2.6 10.3  7.4  5.8 2.4 
Producer prices in industry  14.7  296.5 56.1  28.3 75.7  53.4  130.0 971.1  18.7  2.8 17.5  3.8  1.2 3.4 
GDP deflator      ..      .. 59.6  51.1 72.7  62.8  122.6 971.2  26.7  3.7 6.7  6.7  3.8 2.1 
Average annual wages, nominal  31.5  165.8 113.5  57.8 53.5  53.2  83.8 865.6  43.3  9.7 11.7  7.2  13.0 3.7 
Average annual wages, real (CPI deflated)  6.2  -39.4 11.7  -8.7 -21.7  -5.5  -17.0 -16.6  20.7  6.9 1.2  -0.2  6.7 1.3 
Monetary aggregates (year on year rates of 
change, %) 2/ 
                 
Money supply (M1)   24.0  24.2 40.7  27.3 55.5  43.6  119.3 868.0  23.4  8.7 21.2  28.4  18.8 22.7 
Money supply (broad money)  16.1  118.0 52.5  53.1 78.6  39.6  124.5 359.3  10.1  11.4 26.4  24.8  21.0 18.9 
Time deposits (domestic currency)      ..  513.8 129.7  86.6 50.0  54.9  27.6 146.8  -2.3  19.1 3.9  32.0  80.7 7.8 
Domestic value of foreign currency deposits      ..  582.0 -4.6  16.2 193.9  17.1  300.0 304.6  -3.0  10.5 48.2  22.9  7.5 17.5 
Credit to the corporate sector      ..  112.5 33.6  32.8 31.5  30.8  227.9 183.0  -1.2  9.5 1.0  16.4  24.7 37.0 
Nominal interest rates (%) 3/                   
BNB basic interest rate  4.5  56.5 58.2  58.1 81.8  59.8  245.8 137.1  5.4  4.7 4.0  4.6  4.1 2.7 
Short-term commercial lending interest      ..  67.8 74.0  78.3 102.6  79.8  300.2 209.9  14.2  13.6 12.2  11.7  10.0 9.2 
Commercial rate on (one-month) time deposits      ..  59.2 55.6  52.0 65.1  43.6  146.4 80.8  3.0  3.3 3.1  3.2  2.8 3.1 
External variables (mn USD)                   
Gross foreign debt (endperiod)  10007  12247 13806  13836 11338  10148  9602 9760  10252  10204 10364  10616  11245 13032 
Forex reserves excluding gold (endperiod)      ..  331 935  655 1002  1236  484 2249  2831  3083 3342  3290  4407 6291 
Merchandise exports   5266  3279 3922  3721 3985  5355  4890 4940  4297  4006 4825  5107  5692 7439 
Merchandise imports   5482  2647 4468  4757 4185  5658  5074 4932  5031  5515 6507  7240  7903 10742 
Trade balance (-deficit)  -216  632 -546  -1036 -199  -303  -184 8  -734  -1509 -1683  -2134  -2211 -3303 
Current account balance (-deficit)  -1152  -77 -360  -1098 -32  -198  164 1046  -61  -652 -702  -885  -677 -1648 
FDI annual flow (mn USD) (BOP statistics)  4  56 42  40 105  90  109 505  537  819 1002  689  458 1361 
FDI cumulative stock (mn USD)  4  60 101  141 247  337  446 951  1488  2307 3309  3998  4456 5817 
Exchange rate                   
Nominal exch. rate, ann. average (BGN/USD)  0.005  0.017 0.023  0.028 0.054  0.067  0.178 1.682  1.760  1.836 2.123  2.185  2.077 1.733 
Nominal exch. rate, ann. average (BGN/EUR)  0.001  0.021 0.030  0.032 0.065  0.087  0.220 1.896  1.972  1.956 1.956  1.956  1.956 1.956 
Nominal effective exch. rate, rate of change, %  ..  30.0 275.5  44.7 16.1  99.7  29.6 159.3  802.1  4.5 2.3  7.4  1.3 .. 
Selected ratios (% of GDP)                   
Monetization (M1)      ..  15.5 14.0  13.1 10.9  9.3  7.4 7.2  10.0  10.5 11.5  13.1  14.6 16.6 
Monetization (broad money)      ..  60.8 67.5  65.1 63.0  56.9  44.1 23.0  25.7  27.3 30.3  33.5  38.1 43.5 
Monetization (time deposits)      ..  .. 22.7  29.2 26.2  25.9  15.9 3.3  3.6  3.5 3.7  3.7  6.2 6.8 
Monetization (foreign currency deposits)  ..  22.4 21.5  14.1 18.7  15.4  16.0 12.5  10.6  10.3 12.1  14.0  15.4 15.9 
Monetization (corporate credit)      ..  67.6 68.5  64.0 50.2  35.5  34.5 16.3  13.9  13.8 13.5  12.5  13.2 17.4 
Trade balance (-deficit)  -2.1  7.8 -6.3  -9.6 -2.1  -2.3  -1.9 0.1  -5.8  -11.6 -13.4  -15.7  -14.2 -16.6 
Current account balance (-deficit)  -11.4  -0.9 -4.2  -10.2 -0.3  -1.5  1.6 10.1  -0.5  -5.0 -5.6  -6.5  -4.4 -8.3 
Consolidated government balance (-deficit)  -4.9  -3.6 -5.2  -10.8 -5.8  -5.6  -10.4 -2.4  1.0  -0.9 -1.0  -0.9  -0.7 -0.1 
Total public debt      ..      .. 161.4  156.0 159.5  107.9  149.9 104.0  83.1  77.7 80.0  68.8  59.6 53.3 
FDI annual flow   0.0  0.7 0.5  0.4 1.1  0.7  1.1 4.9  4.2  6.3 8.0  5.1  2.9 6.9 
FDI cumulative stock  0.0  0.7 1.2  1.3 2.5  2.6  4.5 9.2  11.7  17.8 26.3  29.4  28.6 29.3 
 
1/ Endperiod ratio (%), registered unemployed only; 2/ December over December; 3/ Average annual compound rates 
Source: National Statistical Institute; Bulgarian National Bank; author's own calculations.   51
 
Table 4. The privatization process in Bulgaria: commercial sales
1/

















commitments  Total 
   1993  63  0  63  44.2  28.0  59.0  131.2 
   1994  161  26  187  144.3  88.6  201.7  434.5 
   1995  318  35  353  113.7  68.2  151.9  333.8 
   1996  513  71  584  187.0  231.8  179.3  598.1 
   1997  584  184  768  571.4  36.2  890.9  1498.5 
   1998  1086  225  1311  567.3  44.5  369.5  981.3 
   1999  1211  474  1685  654.2  498.8  1373.1  2526.0 
   2000  590  736  1326  395.9  44.8  144.2  584.9 
   2001  231  496  727  175.5  3.0  34.7  213.2 
   2002  103  92  195  162.7  35.4  44.9  243.1 
   2003  118  229  347  267.0  1.3  13.8  282.2 
   2004
 3/  165  1039  1204  413.8  89.1  509.4  1012.3 
 
1/
 The data in the table do not include information on firms privatized through the mass privatization scheme or 
firms privatized by the municipal councils. 
2/
 Sales of minority stakes in already privatized firms. 
3/
 As of end-August 2004. 
 
Source: Bulgarian Privatization Agency. 
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 Table 5.  The privatization of the Bulgarian corporate sector: breakdown of firms’ total sales by ownership categories, 1995-2001 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Total economy, of which   100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
     SOEs  73.1  67.1  52.8  30.3  26.9  22.3  20.3 
     Domestically controlled private firms (incl. privatized) with 20 or more employees  10.1  10.5  23.9  32.5  30.6  31.6  34.5 
     Domestically controlled de novo private firms with less than 20 employees  15.2  17.6  16.1  26.4  25.8  26.2  27.0 
     Foreign controlled firms   1.6  4.8  7.3  10.8  16.6  19.9  18.1 
Total manufacturing, of which   100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
     SOEs  87.7  83.8  58.3  33.5  18.3  10.8  8.4 
     Domestically controlled private firms (incl. privatized) with 20 or more employees  6.8  8.5  31.6  46.6  47.3  46.7  59.6 
     Domestically controlled de novo private firms with less than 20 employees  3.6  4.5  3.6  6.3  6.1  6.1  9.1 
     Foreign controlled private firms with less than 20 employees  1.8  3.3  6.5  13.5  28.3  36.4  22.9 
 
Note: The coverage in 2001 is different from previous years. 
Source: National Statistical Institute; authors’ own calculations. 
 
 
Table 6. Bulgaria's progress in systemic and structural reforms: EBRD indicators, 1994-2003 
 
Enterprises  Markets and trade  Financial institutions  Legal 
reform 
Infra-
structure     





















































1994  40 2  2  2  3 4  n.a.  2 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  2.50  3.50 
1995  45 2  3  2  3 4  2  2 2  3  n.a.  2.56  3.29 
1996  45 2  3  2  2 4  2  2 2  4  n.a.  2.56  3.29 
1997  50 3  3  2.33  3 4  2  2.67 2  n.a.  n.a.  2.75  3.67 
1998  50 3  3  2.33  3 4  2  2.67 2  n.a.  n.a.  2.75  3.71 
1999  60 3  3.33  2.33  3 4.33  2  2.67 2  n.a.  n.a.  2.83  3.71 
2000  70 3.67  3.67  2.33  3 4.33  2.33  3 2  n.a.  n.a.  3.04  3.75 
2001  70 3.67  3.67  2.33  3 4.33  2.33  3.33 2.33  n.a.  2.75  3.08  3.75 
2002  70 3.67  3.67  2.33  3 4.33  2.33  3.33 2.33  n.a.  2.67  3.07  3.75 
2003  75 3.67  3.67  2.67  3 4.33  2.33  3.33 2.33  n.a.  2.67  3.11  3.75 
 
Note: minimum score = 1; maximum score = 4; 4.33 = transition over. 
Source: EBRD Transition Report, various issues.   53
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Figure 3. Consolidated general government balance: total revenue, non-interest and interest 
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